Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Comprehensive Policy Analysis: History, Partisan Motivations, Impacts of Reform, and Policy Recommendations for the AI Era
February 2026 • Lodi411.com
Executive Summary
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has been called "the twenty-six words that created the internet." Enacted in 1996, this law shields online platforms from liability for user-generated content while encouraging good-faith content moderation. Three decades later, it has become one of the most contested provisions in American technology policy, with both Republicans and Democrats calling for reform—but for fundamentally different reasons.
This analysis examines the history and scope of Section 230, the distinct partisan motivations driving reform efforts, the potential impacts of proposed changes on the internet ecosystem, and the emerging challenges posed by generative AI. It concludes with policy recommendations that aim to protect free speech, safeguard minors, and address AI-generated disinformation while preserving the core legal framework that enabled the modern internet.
- Republicans seek to limit platforms' content moderation authority, arguing that "Big Tech censorship" suppresses conservative voices.
- Democrats focus on holding platforms accountable for child exploitation, algorithmic amplification of harmful content, and disinformation.
- Bipartisan concern is growing around AI-generated deepfakes, child safety online, and the need for platform transparency.
- Key legislation includes the TAKE IT DOWN Act (signed May 2025), the Sunset Section 230 Act, and the Deepfake Liability Act (both introduced December 2025).
Part I: Overview and History of Section 230
1.1 What Section 230 Says
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230, contains two critical provisions that have shaped the modern internet. Subsection (c)(1), often called the "shield" provision, states: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." In practical terms, this means that websites, social media platforms, and other online services cannot be held legally liable for content posted by their users, even if that content is defamatory, misleading, or otherwise harmful.
Subsection (c)(2), sometimes called the "sword" provision, protects platforms that choose to moderate content in good faith. It provides that platforms shall not be liable for "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable." This provision was designed to encourage platforms to proactively clean up harmful content without fear of being sued for those editorial choices.
The Two Pillars of Section 230:
§ 230(c)(1) — The Shield: Platforms are not treated as the publisher or speaker of third-party content.
§ 230(c)(2) — The Sword: Platforms are protected when they moderate content in good faith.
1.2 Historical Origins
Section 230 was born from a specific legal paradox of the mid-1990s. Two landmark cases created an untenable situation for the nascent internet industry. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. (1991), a federal court held that CompuServe was not liable for defamatory content in a forum it hosted because it did not exercise editorial control—effectively treating it as a distributor, like a bookstore, rather than a publisher. However, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. (1995), a New York court reached the opposite conclusion: because Prodigy employed content guidelines and used screening software to moderate its bulletin boards, the court held that Prodigy had assumed the role of a publisher and could therefore be sued for defamatory posts by its users.
Together, these decisions created a perverse incentive structure: platforms that did nothing to moderate content were protected, while platforms that attempted to create safer, more civil spaces were exposed to greater liability. This was precisely the problem that Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) sought to address. Their bipartisan amendment, originally known as the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, became Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996, as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The legislative intent was twofold: to promote the continued development of the internet as a forum for free expression, and to encourage platforms to self-regulate and remove objectionable content without fear of being treated as publishers of all content they hosted. Congress explicitly stated in the statute’s findings that the internet offered "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse" and that it was "the policy of the United States to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet."
1.3 Scope and Judicial Expansion
Over the following three decades, courts interpreted Section 230 expansively—far beyond what its original drafters may have anticipated. Key judicial milestones include:
1.4 The 26 Words That Created the Internet
Legal scholar Jeff Kosseff famously described Section 230(c)(1) as "the twenty-six words that created the internet." While this characterization is somewhat hyperbolic—the internet would have developed regardless—it captures an essential truth about the law’s role. Without Section 230’s protections, platforms hosting user-generated content would face potentially limitless liability for the speech of billions of users. The practical result would have been either: (a) platforms that refused to moderate any content to avoid the "publisher" designation, resulting in a chaotic and harmful online environment; or (b) platforms that aggressively pre-screened all content before publication, effectively destroying the real-time, participatory nature of the internet as we know it.
Section 230 enabled the rise of social media, user review sites, online marketplaces, discussion forums, and virtually every platform where ordinary people can publish content to a global audience. It has been a foundational element of American internet policy, and its influence extends globally, as many of the world’s dominant platforms are American companies operating under this legal framework.
Part II: Partisan Motivations for Reform
Both major American political parties have called for Section 230 reform, but their motivations, while occasionally overlapping, are fundamentally different in diagnosis and desired outcome. Understanding these distinct motivations is critical to evaluating any proposed changes.
2.1 Republican Motivations
2.1.1 Anti-Censorship and Viewpoint Neutrality
The dominant Republican concern is that large social media platforms use their content moderation authority under Section 230(c)(2) to suppress conservative speech, deplatform right-leaning voices, and create a politically biased information environment. This concern intensified during the Trump era, with high-profile incidents including the suspension of President Trump’s social media accounts following January 6, 2021, the suppression of the New York Post’s Hunter Biden laptop story in October 2020, and various instances of conservative commentators being flagged, shadow-banned, or removed from platforms.
Republican legislators have argued that the "otherwise objectionable" language in Section 230(c)(2) is impermissibly vague and has been exploited by platforms to justify politically motivated censorship. Congresswoman Harriet Hageman (R-WY), who introduced the Sunset to Reform Section 230 Act in December 2025, specifically argued that "otherwise objectionable" should be replaced with an "unlawful" standard, which would limit platforms’ moderation authority to removing content that violates existing law rather than content they subjectively find objectionable.
2.1.2 Executive Branch Enforcement Posture
Under the Trump administration, key federal agencies have adopted an explicitly hostile posture toward platform content moderation. At a Department of Justice forum on "Big Tech Censorship" in April 2025, officials from the DOJ, FTC, and FCC articulated a novel interpretation of Section 230: that while the statute protects platforms from liability for hosting third-party content, it does not protect their decisions to remove content or deplatform users. FCC Chairman Brendan Carr stated that the FCC would "push the envelope on Section 230 reform" to "smash the censorship cartel." This interpretation represents a dramatic departure from decades of judicial precedent and legal scholarship.
2.1.3 The Common Carrier Theory
Some Republicans have advocated treating large social media platforms as common carriers—analogous to telephone companies or postal services—that must carry all lawful speech without discrimination. Justice Clarence Thomas explored this theory in a 2021 concurrence, suggesting that dominant platforms could potentially be regulated as common carriers. However, the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Moody v. NetChoice cast significant doubt on the viability of this approach by affirming that content curation is First Amendment-protected expression.
2.2 Democratic Motivations
2.2.1 Child Safety and Online Exploitation
The primary Democratic concern is that Section 230 shields platforms from accountability for hosting content that harms children, including child sexual abuse material (CSAM), predatory behavior, cyberbullying, and content that promotes eating disorders, self-harm, and suicide among minors. Internal documents leaked by whistleblower Frances Haugen in 2021 revealed that Meta’s own research showed Instagram was harmful to teenage girls’ mental health, intensifying calls for reform.
Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) has been a leading voice on this issue, arguing that platforms use Section 230 as a shield against accountability while their services cause documented harm to young people. The bipartisan EARN IT Act, co-sponsored by both Democrats and Republicans, would condition Section 230 immunity on platforms demonstrating robust efforts to combat child exploitation.
2.2.2 Algorithmic Amplification and Radicalization
Democrats have also focused on how platforms’ recommendation algorithms amplify harmful content—including extremist material, conspiracy theories, and health misinformation—for engagement and profit. Proposed legislation like the SAFE TECH Act would narrow Section 230’s protections to exclude paid content (advertisements) and create new avenues for civil rights claims against platforms whose algorithmic systems discriminate or cause harm.
2.2.3 Disinformation and Election Integrity
Democratic lawmakers have expressed concern that Section 230 creates insufficient incentive for platforms to combat disinformation, particularly around elections. The proliferation of fabricated content—from deepfake videos to AI-generated news articles—has heightened these concerns. However, Democrats face an internal tension: aggressive content moderation to combat disinformation can be perceived (particularly by Republicans) as partisan censorship, especially when factual disputes involve contested political claims.
2.3 Areas of Bipartisan Agreement
Despite their divergent motivations, there are notable areas of bipartisan overlap:
| Issue | Democratic Position | Republican Position |
|---|---|---|
| Child Safety | Platform accountability for CSAM and youth harms | Remove content harmful to children; restrict moderation scope |
| Platform Power | Regulate algorithmic amplification and monopolistic behavior | Prevent platforms from censoring lawful speech; break up Big Tech |
| Deepfakes | Protect victims of nonconsensual intimate imagery; prevent election disinformation | Protect individuals from AI-generated fraud and impersonation |
| Transparency | Require disclosure of moderation policies and algorithmic systems | Require disclosure of moderation decisions, especially political removals |
| Sunset/Reform | Force reform addressing child safety and harmful content | Force reform limiting moderation power and restoring free speech |
The bipartisan Sunset Section 230 Act, introduced in December 2025 by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and others, proposes sunsetting Section 230 by January 1, 2027, to force comprehensive reform negotiations. This represents perhaps the strongest signal of shared frustration with the status quo, even if the parties disagree profoundly about what should replace it.
Partisan Reform Priorities: Democrat vs. Republican Emphasis
Part III: Impacts of Proposed Changes and Repeal
3.1 Impact on the Broader Internet Ecosystem
3.1.1 The Small Platform Problem
One of the most significant and underappreciated consequences of weakening or repealing Section 230 would be its disproportionate impact on small and mid-sized platforms, startups, and independent websites. Large platforms like Meta, Google, and X have the financial resources, legal teams, and technical infrastructure to absorb increased compliance costs and litigation risk. Smaller competitors do not. A legal regime that increases liability exposure would create higher barriers to entry, potentially cementing the dominance of existing tech giants—an ironic outcome given that both parties claim to oppose Big Tech monopolies.
3.1.2 Content Moderation at Scale
Without Section 230’s protections, platforms would face a binary choice: either moderate aggressively to minimize legal risk (resulting in widespread removal of legitimate speech) or abandon moderation entirely and accept being flooded with harmful content. Neither outcome serves the public interest. The sheer volume of content posted daily—hundreds of millions of posts across major platforms—makes perfect human moderation impossible, and automated systems remain notoriously prone to false positives, particularly for satire, political speech, news reporting, and content in non-English languages.
3.1.3 Legal Fragmentation
In the absence of a clear federal framework, state legislatures have already begun passing their own social media regulations. Texas and Florida enacted laws restricting platforms’ content moderation practices; these laws were partially challenged and reached the Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice. If Section 230 were repealed without a federal replacement, the resulting legal patchwork would force platforms to comply with potentially contradictory requirements across 50 states—a compliance nightmare that would favor large, legally sophisticated companies.
3.2 Impact on Online Communication
3.2.1 The Chilling Effect on Speech
Increased platform liability would inevitably produce a chilling effect on user speech. Platforms facing potential lawsuits for user-generated content would implement more aggressive content filters and removal policies. This would disproportionately affect political speech, which is often contentious and could be flagged as potentially defamatory; whistleblower disclosures and investigative journalism; satire and parody, which automated systems struggle to distinguish from sincere harmful speech; and speech by marginalized communities, which is frequently flagged by content moderation systems at higher rates.
3.2.2 The Notice-and-Takedown Trap
Several proposed reforms, including elements of the TAKE IT DOWN Act signed into law in May 2025, require platforms to remove flagged content within specific timeframes (often 48 hours). While well-intentioned, such requirements create a powerful tool for bad-faith actors to suppress legitimate speech through frivolous takedown requests. Without robust safeguards, notice-and-takedown regimes enable weaponized reporting—where political opponents, business competitors, or personal adversaries flood platforms with removal demands to silence lawful content.
3.3 Impact on Social Media Specifically
3.3.1 The Algorithmic Liability Question
Multiple proposals seek to strip Section 230 protections from algorithmically recommended content, based on the theory that when a platform’s algorithm surfaces content to a user, the platform has become something more than a passive host. This approach raises profound questions: virtually all content delivery on modern platforms involves algorithmic curation of some kind, from chronological feed ordering to personalized recommendations. Drawing a clear, legally workable line between "passive hosting" and "active amplification" is extraordinarily difficult. A broad interpretation could make platforms liable for any content they display to any user, effectively eliminating the practical protections of Section 230.
3.3.2 The Business Model Question
Social media platforms are built on engagement-driven advertising models that reward content generating strong emotional responses—which often correlates with sensational, outrageous, or divisive material. Section 230 reform that targets algorithmic amplification without addressing the underlying business model may simply shift harmful practices rather than eliminate them. Platforms might move to less transparent methods of content curation, making accountability harder rather than easier.
3.3.3 International Precedents
Other nations are already moving ahead with platform accountability frameworks. In June 2025, Brazil’s Supreme Court ruled that social media platforms are accountable for illegal user-generated content, with six of eleven justices backing fines for non-removal. The European Union’s Digital Services Act imposes transparency and risk-assessment obligations on platforms operating in Europe. These international developments provide both cautionary tales and potential models for U.S. reform, though the First Amendment’s strong speech protections mean that European-style content regulation may face constitutional challenges in the United States.
Projected Impacts of Section 230 Changes by Stakeholder Group
Part IV: The AI Challenge
4.1 Generative AI and the Publisher/Platform Distinction
The emergence of generative AI represents the most fundamental challenge to Section 230’s legal framework since its enactment. Section 230 was designed for a world where platforms hosted content created by human users. Generative AI systems—including large language models like ChatGPT, image generators like Midjourney, and video synthesis tools—create entirely new content that may not have been produced by any human "information content provider."
Legal scholars have identified a critical distinction: when an AI system retrieves and organizes existing information (functioning like a search engine), Section 230 protections may plausibly apply. But when an AI system generates novel content—text, images, or video that did not previously exist—the platform operating that system begins to look more like an "information content provider" itself, potentially falling outside Section 230’s shield. The Congressional Research Service has noted that AI-generated "hallucinations"—fabricated content with no basis in training data—are particularly problematic, as they represent entirely new information created by the AI provider rather than by any third party.
The Third Circuit’s decision in Anderson v. TikTok suggests that algorithmic curation constitutes "expressive activity" not covered by Section 230—an analysis that could logically extend to AI-generated content, which involves far more active content creation than algorithmic sorting. As one legal scholar put it, transformer-based chatbots do not merely extract and organize existing content—they generate new, organic outputs that look more like authored speech than neutral intermediation.
The AI Liability Spectrum: Legal scholars suggest AI systems exist on a spectrum. On one end, search-like retrieval and summarization may retain Section 230 protection. On the other end, original content generation—especially AI "hallucinations" that fabricate entirely new information—looks far more like publisher activity that falls outside Section 230’s shield.
4.2 Deepfakes and Synthetic Media
AI-generated deepfakes represent one of the most immediate and tangible harms in this space. The technology has advanced to the point where synthetic video and audio can be nearly indistinguishable from genuine recordings. The primary harms include nonconsensual intimate imagery (the overwhelming majority of deepfake content targets women and teenage girls), political disinformation through fabricated statements by public figures, financial fraud through voice cloning and synthetic video, and reputational destruction through fabricated depictions of individuals in compromising situations.
Congress has begun to address deepfakes specifically. The TAKE IT DOWN Act, signed into law in May 2025, criminalizes nonconsensual intimate deepfakes and requires platforms to remove such content within 48 hours of notification. The proposed Deepfake Liability Act, introduced in December 2025 by Representatives Celeste Maloy (R-UT) and Jake Auchincloss (D-MA), goes further by conditioning Section 230 protections on platforms implementing a "duty of care" regarding deepfakes and cyberstalking, and by amending Section 230’s definition of "information content provider" to clarify that AI-generated content is not automatically covered by platform immunity.
4.3 AI-Powered Disinformation at Scale
Generative AI dramatically reduces the cost and increases the sophistication of disinformation campaigns. Where producing convincing fake news articles, fabricated images, or synthetic video previously required significant skill and resources, AI tools now enable mass production of highly realistic disinformation by virtually anyone. This creates new vectors for civil fraud through AI-generated fake reviews, testimonials, and endorsements; electoral manipulation through synthetic media depicting candidates saying things they never said; public health misinformation through AI-generated fake medical research or advice; and financial market manipulation through fabricated news articles or analyst reports.
The challenge for regulators is that AI-generated content exists on a spectrum from clearly synthetic to virtually indistinguishable from genuine content, and detection technology consistently lags behind generation technology. Watermarking and provenance standards (such as the C2PA content authenticity initiative) offer partial solutions but can be circumvented or stripped.
4.4 Emerging Case Law
Key Case
Walters v. OpenAI: A Georgia radio host sued after ChatGPT fabricated a legal complaint accusing him of embezzlement—an event that never occurred. The case raised fundamental questions about whether AI companies can claim Section 230 immunity for content their systems generate. Legal experts argued that because the defamatory content was produced by OpenAI’s model rather than by a third-party user, Section 230’s shield should not apply.
Separate lawsuits against OpenAI and Character.AI have alleged that AI products caused harm to minors, with Character.AI notably declining to assert a Section 230 defense in the case of a 14-year-old who died by suicide after interactions with its chatbot. These cases suggest that both the courts and AI companies themselves recognize the limits of applying a 1996 statute designed for user forums to AI-generated content.
Senator Josh Hawley’s No Section 230 Immunity for AI Act sought to explicitly exclude generative AI from Section 230’s protections. While that specific bill was blocked, the principle it articulated—that AI-generated content deserves a distinct liability framework—has gained increasing bipartisan support and is reflected in the Deepfake Liability Act’s amendment to the definition of "information content provider."
AI Content: Section 230 Applicability by Content Type
Part V: Recommended Reforms
The following recommendations aim to balance the preservation of online free expression with meaningful accountability for platforms and AI systems, protection of minors, and defenses against AI-enabled disinformation and fraud. These proposals are designed to be technologically adaptable, constitutionally sound in light of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment rulings, and practical to implement.
5.1 Preserve the Core Shield with Targeted Carve-Outs
Section 230(c)(1)’s basic protection for platforms hosting user-generated content should be preserved. Complete repeal would cause more harm than it prevents, devastating small platforms and chilling legitimate speech. Instead, Congress should create narrowly defined carve-outs for specific categories of well-documented harm:
Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM): Platforms should be required to implement best-practice detection systems (such as PhotoDNA hash-matching and AI-based detection) and to report CSAM to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. Failure to implement reasonable detection and reporting systems should remove Section 230 protection for CSAM-related claims.
Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery and Deepfakes: Building on the TAKE IT DOWN Act, platforms should be required to maintain responsive notice-and-takedown processes for intimate deepfakes, with mandatory safeguards against bad-faith abuse of the reporting process. This should include a counter-notification system (similar to DMCA) and penalties for filing false reports.
AI-Generated Content Targeting Identified Individuals: Section 230 protection should not extend to AI-generated content that falsely depicts identifiable real people in defamatory, fraudulent, or sexually explicit contexts. This carve-out should apply to both the AI system operator and any platform that knowingly hosts such content after receiving a valid takedown notice.
5.2 Create a Distinct Legal Framework for AI-Generated Content
Congress should explicitly address the gap between Section 230’s user-generated content framework and the realities of AI content generation:
Define AI Content Provider Liability: When an AI system generates content that is not based on a specific user’s input (e.g., AI "hallucinations" or autonomous content generation), the operator of that AI system should be treated as an information content provider and should not receive Section 230 immunity.
Establish Provenance and Labeling Standards: Require AI-generated content to carry machine-readable provenance metadata (building on the C2PA standard). Platforms that strip provenance information or fail to display AI content labels should face reduced liability protections.
Create a Safe Harbor for Good-Faith AI Moderation: Just as Section 230(c)(2) protects platforms that moderate user content in good faith, a new provision should protect platforms that implement reasonable AI content detection and labeling systems, even if those systems are imperfect.
5.3 Protect Free Speech Through Due Process Requirements
Any reform must guard against both government-mandated censorship and private over-moderation:
Notice and Appeal Rights: Platforms above a defined user threshold should be required to provide users with specific notice when content is removed or accounts are restricted, including the specific policy basis for the action and a meaningful appeal process with human review. This addresses concerns about opaque censorship without mandating viewpoint neutrality, which would be constitutionally problematic under Moody v. NetChoice.
Anti-Weaponization Safeguards: Any notice-and-takedown system should include counter-notification procedures, penalties for false or bad-faith reports, and protections for newsworthy content and matters of public concern.
Preserve Editorial Discretion: Consistent with the First Amendment principles affirmed in Moody v. NetChoice, any reform should explicitly preserve platforms’ right to establish and enforce their own content policies.
5.4 Address Disinformation Through Transparency, Not Censorship
Combating disinformation through content removal is both constitutionally fraught and practically ineffective. More effective approaches include:
Algorithmic Transparency: Require large platforms to provide regulators and qualified researchers with access to data about how their recommendation algorithms function, what content they amplify, and what metrics they optimize for.
Advertising Transparency: Require disclosure of the source, funding, and targeting criteria for all paid political and issue advertising, including AI-generated advertising content. Remove Section 230 protections for paid advertisements.
Media Literacy Investment: Federal investment in digital media literacy education, particularly for minors and older adults who are disproportionately vulnerable to disinformation.
Provenance Infrastructure: Support the development and adoption of content provenance standards that allow users to verify the origin and modification history of media content.
5.5 Child Safety Through Design, Not Just Moderation
Age-Appropriate Design Standards: Require platforms to implement age-appropriate design codes that consider the best interests of minors in product design decisions, addressing the root cause—platform designs that exploit developmental vulnerabilities.
Prohibition on Harmful Algorithmic Targeting of Minors: Prohibit platforms from using engagement-optimization algorithms to serve content to verified minors. Platforms should default to chronological or safety-optimized content delivery for users under 18.
Parental Control Infrastructure: Require platforms to provide robust, easily accessible parental controls and transparent reporting on minors’ usage patterns, without creating surveillance infrastructure that could be misused.
5.6 Periodic Review and Adaptive Governance
Mandatory Five-Year Review: Require a comprehensive Congressional review of Section 230 every five years, informed by a mandatory Government Accountability Office report assessing the law’s effectiveness, emerging technologies (including AI), and documented harms.
Technology Advisory Commission: Establish a standing commission of technologists, legal scholars, civil liberties advocates, child safety experts, and industry representatives to advise Congress on the technological implications of proposed reforms.
Conclusion
Section 230 has been one of the most consequential pieces of technology legislation in American history. It enabled the creation of the modern internet and continues to serve important functions in protecting online speech and enabling platform innovation. However, the digital landscape of 2026 bears little resemblance to the internet of 1996. The rise of social media platforms with billions of users, the emergence of generative AI capable of producing realistic synthetic content, the documented harms to children from platform design choices, and the weaponization of online tools for disinformation and fraud all demand a thoughtful evolution of the legal framework.
The greatest risk in the current political environment is not that Section 230 will remain unchanged—reform momentum is clearly building—but that reform will be driven by partisan grievances rather than evidence, resulting in changes that either chill legitimate speech or strip platforms of the ability to maintain safe spaces for users. The challenge is to craft a framework that is narrow enough to preserve the vibrant, participatory internet that Section 230 helped create, yet targeted enough to address the specific, documented harms that have emerged as technology has evolved.
The recommendations in this analysis attempt to chart that middle course: preserving the core liability shield that allows platforms and users to thrive, while creating specific accountability mechanisms for child safety, AI-generated content, deepfakes, and disinformation that reflect the technological realities of the current era. The principles of transparency, due process, technological adaptability, and constitutional fidelity should guide any reform effort, ensuring that the next chapter of internet governance is as forward-looking as Section 230 was in its time.
This analysis reflects the legislative and judicial landscape as of February 2026, including the TAKE IT DOWN Act (signed May 2025), the Sunset Section 230 Act (introduced December 2025), the Deepfake Liability Act (introduced December 2025), and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Moody v. NetChoice (2024) and Gonzalez v. Google (2023).
Sources & References
- H.R.6746 — Sunset To Reform Section 230 Act, 119th Congress (2025–2026)
- Public Knowledge — Assessing Section 230 Reform Proposals in the 119th Congress (February 2026)
- Lawfare — What Has Congress Been Doing on Section 230? (May 2025)
- Sen. Lindsey Graham — Sunset Section 230 Act Press Release (December 2025)
- Rep. Harriet Hageman — Sunset to Reform Section 230 Act Press Release (December 2025)
- Crowell & Moring — Section 230 Reform: What Websites Need to Know Now
- Crowell & Moring — Is Section 230 Going to Change? FTC, DOJ and FCC Signal Change
- University of Chicago Business Law Review — Generative AI Meets Section 230
- Harvard Law Review — Beyond Section 230: Principles for AI Governance (April 2025)
- Fortune — Why Section 230 May Not Protect Big Tech in the AI Age (October 2025)
- American Action Forum — Section 230 in the Era of Generative AI (October 2025)
- American Bar Association — Generative AI’s Section 230 Tightrope Walk
- Congressional Research Service — Section 230 Immunity and Generative AI
- Rep. Jake Auchincloss — Deepfake Liability Act Press Release (December 2025)
- Deseret News — New Deepfake Liability Act (December 2025)
- Brown Rudnick — Legislating Deepfakes and AI Tort Liability
- Stanford HAI — Does Section 230 Cover Generative AI?
- Brookings Institution — The Section 230 Project