The El Paso Drone Crisis
The El Paso Drone Crisis
Cartel Drone Operations, U.S. Counter-Drone Technology & the February 2026 Airspace Shutdown
Comprehensive Analysis • February 12, 2026 • Lodi411.com
Executive Summary
On February 11, 2026, the FAA issued an unprecedented order closing all airspace within a 10-nautical-mile radius of El Paso International Airport for 10 days, citing “special security reasons.” The closure — the first of its kind since the September 11, 2001 attacks — grounded all commercial, cargo, and general aviation traffic, disrupting operations for nearly 700,000 residents and diverting emergency medical evacuation flights to Las Cruces, New Mexico, approximately 45 miles away.
The airspace was reopened approximately seven hours later following intervention at the White House level, but the incident exposed a volatile convergence of three critical factors: escalating Mexican cartel drone incursions along the U.S.-Mexico border, the deployment of advanced counter-drone directed-energy weapons by the U.S. military and Customs and Border Protection, and a dangerous breakdown in interagency coordination between the Department of Defense and the FAA.
The February 2026 El Paso Airspace Shutdown
Timeline of Events
Late Evening, Feb. 10, 2026
The FAA issues a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) classifying airspace around El Paso as National Defense Airspace and imposing a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) through February 20. The notice warns that pilots violating the restriction could be intercepted, detained, and questioned — and that authorities could use deadly force against aircraft deemed to pose an imminent security threat.
Late Tuesday Night – Early Wednesday
Airport staff, airlines, local officials, and the El Paso community are caught off guard. A recorded exchange between an air traffic controller and a Southwest Airlines pilot suggests the airport received minimal advance notice. El Paso Mayor Renard Johnson says he was not informed until after the alert was issued. Medical evacuation flights are diverted to Las Cruces, NM.
Early Morning, Feb. 11, 2026
The closure becomes a topic of intense focus in the White House. It is discussed at a regular meeting in Chief of Staff Susie Wiles’ office. Texas lawmakers press for answers. Congressional members are briefed — but receive a different explanation than what the White House will later announce publicly.
Mid-Morning, Feb. 11, 2026
Within minutes of the White House meeting, the FAA lifts the restrictions. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announces the threat has been “neutralized” and flights can resume. The total closure lasted approximately seven hours.
Competing Official Narratives
The incident produced sharply conflicting explanations, creating significant public confusion:
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy stated the FAA and the “Department of War” acted swiftly to address a cartel drone incursion into U.S. airspace, that the threat was neutralized, and there was no danger to commercial travel.
Members of Congress briefed early Wednesday were told the closure related to testing of a high-energy laser weapon system near Fort Bliss — with no mention of cartel drones. Multiple sources identified the technology as a counter-drone directed-energy laser.
Multiple outlets (CBS, CNN, NBC, NPR, AP) reported the true cause was a breakdown in coordination between the Pentagon and FAA. The DoD sought to test counter-drone laser technology near Fort Bliss before a scheduled Feb. 20 coordination meeting. When the FAA learned the military intended to proceed without final safety clearance, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford ordered the airspace closure unilaterally — without alerting the White House, Pentagon, or DHS.
Two sources told CNN that Customs and Border Protection, not the military, was physically operating the laser when it was used this week. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had signed off on loaning CBP the technology in recent weeks, with Defense personnel present.
Local Impact
El Paso International Airport handled 3.49 million passengers in the first 11 months of 2025 and serves Southwest, Delta, United, American, and Frontier Airlines. Approximately 40 departures were scheduled for Wednesday alone. Mayor Johnson characterized the episode as “chaos and confusion,” calling it a “major and unnecessary disruption, one that has not occurred since 9/11.” He emphasized that the city, airport, hospitals, and county emergency management were not informed in advance. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum said she had “no information about the use of drones on the border.”
Mexican Cartel Drone Operations
Scale of the Threat
The scope of cartel drone activity along the U.S.-Mexico border has reached staggering proportions. Steven Willoughby, deputy director of DHS’s counter-drone program, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2025 that transnational criminal organizations use drones nearly every day to transport narcotics across the border and to conduct hostile surveillance of law enforcement.
Key Border Drone Statistics (DHS Data)
- 27,000+ unique drones detected within 500 meters (1,640 ft) of the U.S. southern border in the last six months of 2024
- Those drones conducted approximately 60,000 total flights during the same period
- The majority flew above 400 feet (max legal altitude) or between 8 PM and 4 AM
- Since 2019, CBP has seized thousands of pounds of meth, fentanyl, and narcotics from drone smuggling
- In H2 2024 alone, over 1,200 pounds of narcotics were seized from drone operations
- In October 2023, one drone carried 3.6 lbs of fentanyl pills — enough to kill tens of thousands
- An average of 328 drones approach within 500m of the border every single day
Cartel Drone Attacks in Mexico (SEDENA Data)
Types of Drones in Cartel Service
Mexican cartels deploy a diverse inventory of unmanned aerial systems, ranging from off-the-shelf consumer products to custom heavy-lift platforms capable of carrying over 200 pounds:
| Drone Type | Specifications | Cartel Application |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial Quadcopters (DJI, etc.) | 1–5 lb payload; 20–40 min flight; 3–7 mi range | Surveillance of Border Patrol; small drug deliveries; real-time video intel for operations |
| Modified Agricultural Drones | ~1 meter diameter; heavy-lift; originally crop sprayers | Fitted with explosive payload adapters instead of sprayers; bombing attacks in Michoacán cartel warfare |
| Custom Heavy-Lift Drones | Up to 100 kg (220 lbs) cargo capacity; GPS pre-programmed | Bulk fentanyl & narcotics smuggling; satellite-guided to precise landing coordinates |
| FPV Attack Drones | Under $400/unit; high maneuverability; explosive payloads | Precision strikes with contact-detonation; can fly through obstacles & into buildings; adapted from Ukraine battlefield tactics |
| Bomb-Dropping Quadcopters | Commercial frames with improvised release mechanisms | Hover over targets; release IEDs, grenades, or chemical payloads; primary cartel weapon since 2020 |
| Chemical Payload Drones | Modified to carry toxic dispersal systems | Deploying aluminum phosphide & pesticide-based chemical weapons; documented in Michoacán since April 2024 |
Weaponization & Tactical Evolution
Cartel drone capabilities have undergone rapid evolution, closely paralleling developments on actual battlefields:
Early Phase (2017–2019)
The first documented weaponized drone in Mexico was seized in October 2017 during a traffic stop — a commercial quadcopter armed with an improvised explosive. During this period, drones were primarily used for reconnaissance and small-scale smuggling.
Escalation Phase (2020–2023)
According to Mexico’s SEDENA, drone attacks skyrocketed from 5 in 2020 to 107 in 2021, 233 in 2022, and 260 in the first half of 2023 alone. The Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG) established a dedicated “Drone Operators” unit with its own custom insignia. In November 2022, CJNG used drones in coordination with a Cessna aircraft and ground vehicles to attack a police station in Jalisco — the first known combined air-ground cartel assault.
FPV Revolution (2024–Present)
In April 2025, CJNG conducted the first confirmed FPV drone attack in Mexico. Unlike hover-and-drop attacks, FPV drones carry explosives that detonate on contact, enabling precision targeting through obstacles and into buildings — directly mirroring Ukraine battlefield tactics. Evidence suggests cartel operatives may have traveled to Ukraine’s International Legion under false pretenses to gain firsthand FPV combat experience. Colombian and Venezuelan ex-military have been recruited for 3-month drone training camps.
Cartel Counter-Drone Capabilities
In a particularly alarming development, cartels have begun fielding their own counter-drone systems, mirroring a state-level arms race:
- Sinaloa Cartel (Mayito Flaco faction): Photographed with a SkyFend counter-UAS jammer (~$100,000 retail)
- CJNG forces: Documented carrying QR-07S3 Digital Eagle Anti-Drone Guns (~$20,000/unit)
- Cartel “narco-tanks” modified with overhead protective cages to defend against drone strikes — directly echoing Russian and Ukrainian battlefield adaptations
Cartel Drone Capability Evolution
U.S. Counter-Drone Programs & Technologies
Legislative & Regulatory Framework
Counter-drone operations in U.S. domestic airspace are governed primarily by 10 U.S.C. Section 130i, which grants DoD authority to mitigate drone threats to covered facilities through disruption, seizure, or “reasonable force” including destroying aircraft. Congress directed that the Defense Secretary coordinate with Transportation/FAA before implementing actions that might affect aviation safety — a requirement at the heart of the El Paso incident.
DHS counter-drone authority (extending to CBP, ICE, Coast Guard, and Federal Protective Service) is set to expire December 31, 2026, creating significant reauthorization urgency. The FY2025 NDAA directed the Defense Secretary to develop a comprehensive counter-UAS strategy, and the Pentagon released its formal Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems in December 2024.
Directed Energy Weapons
High-Energy Laser (HEL) Systems
| System | Power | Platform | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE M-SHORAD | 50 kW | Stryker vehicle | 4 systems deployed to CENTCOM; reliability challenges in harsh conditions |
| Palletized HEL | 10 kW | Fixed-site | Deployed; part of 17 RCCTO prototypes (11 deployed total) |
| Tactical Vehicle HEL | 20–30 kW | Small tactical vehicles | Multiple prototypes tested; maintainability work ongoing |
| 300 kW HEL | 300 kW | Under development | Designed for cruise missiles and larger threats; developmental |
| E-HEL (Enduring High Energy Laser) | TBD | Modular / vehicle-agnostic | First Army laser program of record; competitive source selection Q2 FY2026; RFI issued Oct 2025 |
| CBP Border Laser (El Paso system) | Classified | Fixed/mobile near Fort Bliss | Pentagon-developed, loaned to CBP; used operationally Feb 2026; triggered airspace closure |
High-Power Microwave (HPM) Systems
- Epirus Leonidas: HPM system on Stryker vehicles; undergoing Army testing. Disables electronics across a broad arc — effective against drone swarms and autonomous UAS that don’t rely on control links
- ExDECS (Expeditionary Directed Energy Counter-Swarm): Epirus derivative delivered to the Navy (April 2025) for Marine Corps testing under the PEGASUS program
- Key HPM Advantage: Can defeat autonomous/AI-guided drones because HPM disrupts onboard electronics, not just communication links
Kinetic Counter-Drone Systems
- Coyote Block 2 Interceptor (RTX Corp.): Army estimates 6,000 kinetic + hundreds of nonkinetic interceptors needed FY2025–2029. Effective but not cost-efficient vs. cheap drones
- DroneHunter F700 (Fortem Technologies): Autonomous interceptor that captures hostile UAS with a net. Dec 2025 partnership with Southern States LLC for utility grid protection
- LIDS (Low-altitude Integrated Defense System): Combines radar detection with Coyote interceptors
- MADIS / L-MADIS: Marine Corps ground-based air defense and counter-UAS, fixed and mobile variants
Detection & Tracking Technologies
- Radar: TrueView (Fortem Technologies) and similar platforms detecting small, low-flying drones evading traditional radar
- RF Detection: Monitoring radio frequency emissions to identify control signals and track operators
- EO/IR (Electro-Optical/Infrared): Camera and thermal imaging for visual ID and tracking
- Electronic Warfare/Jamming: RF jamming to disrupt command-and-control links
- Acoustic Detection: Sound-based sensors identifying drone motor signatures
U.S. Counter-Drone Investment & Scale
DHS Counter-Drone Infrastructure
The Department of Homeland Security has undertaken a massive expansion of counter-drone capabilities:
Permanent Counter-Drone Office (Jan. 2026)
DHS Secretary Kristi Noem announced a permanent Program Executive Office for counter-drone operations, funded with $115 million for America250 celebrations and FIFA World Cup 2026 venue hardening. DHS has conducted over 1,500 counter-drone missions since the start of the current administration.
Budget Commitments
- Initial counter-drone program (Oct 2025): $500 million
- FEMA grants to 11 World Cup host states (Dec 2025): $250 million
- Additional FY2027 allocation: $250 million
- DHS industry RFP for CBP/ICE advanced C-UAS technologies: $1.5 billion contract ceiling
- Host city general security: $625 million available
Airport Threat Data
Since 2021, TSA has reported over 3,000 drone events near U.S. airports. In H1 2025 alone: 162 UAS events near airports, 76 near the 30 busiest airports, and 11 caused aircraft to take evasive action. The NFL documented over 2,000 drone incursions per season; stadium incidents rose from 67 in 2018 to 2,845 in 2023.
Analysis & Implications
The Interagency Coordination Failure
The El Paso incident revealed a dangerous gap between the pace of counter-drone technology deployment and the interagency coordination mechanisms designed to ensure these technologies don’t themselves create safety hazards. The FAA’s mandate to protect civilian airspace directly collided with the Pentagon’s urgency to deploy anti-drone capabilities on the border. Using directed-energy weapons near a major commercial airport — which shares proximity with Fort Bliss and Biggs Army Airfield — without completing the scheduled FAA coordination process represents a systemic failure.
The Escalating Cartel Drone Threat
The data is unambiguous: cartel drone operations have moved from an emerging nuisance to a daily strategic challenge. With 328 drones approaching the border every day, the volume alone overwhelms traditional law enforcement. The evolution from surveillance drones to bomb-dropping quadcopters to FPV strike drones — combined with the acquisition of counter-drone systems by cartels themselves — means the U.S. faces an adversary rapidly iterating its aerial capabilities using commercial technology, battlefield-tested tactics from Ukraine, and international recruiting networks.
The Atlantic Council has warned that FPV drones could be redirected toward U.S. personnel and infrastructure if military operations against cartels escalate — a concern especially relevant given the current administration’s kinetic approach to cartel operations, including naval strikes against narco-trafficking vessels in the eastern Pacific.
Technology Readiness vs. Operational Need
While the U.S. has invested heavily in counter-drone technologies, the El Paso incident exposed the tension between urgent deployment and actual readiness for domestic operations. The Army’s own assessments note that directed-energy systems suffer from reliability problems in rough environments, optics failures, and maintenance challenges requiring clean-room conditions incompatible with field deployment. Israel has successfully combat-deployed its 100 kW Iron Beam laser against drones, but the U.S. has yet to achieve comparable operational maturity.
Implications for Border Communities
For cities like El Paso — and indeed any community along the 2,000-mile southern border — the drone threat is not abstract. Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX), whose district spans 800 miles of the border, described daily cartel drone incursions as “everyday life for us. It’s a Wednesday for us.” The El Paso incident demonstrates that both the threat and the response can create serious disruptions for civilian populations, particularly when federal agencies fail to coordinate with local authorities.
Key Takeaways
1. The cartel drone threat is massive and escalating: 60,000 drone flights in 6 months, with cartels adopting FPV attack drones, chemical weapons, and counter-drone systems of their own.
2. The U.S. is deploying directed-energy weapons on the border: High-energy lasers have moved from testing to operational use, with CBP actively using Pentagon-developed laser technology.
3. Interagency coordination is dangerously inadequate: The El Paso shutdown resulted from DoD proceeding with laser operations without completing FAA safety coordination, creating an unprecedented civilian airspace crisis.
4. Billions in investment signal long-term commitment: ~$7.5B in FY2026 counter-UAS spending, a permanent DHS counter-drone office, and the Army’s first laser program of record indicate this is now a permanent dimension of border security.
5. The institutional frameworks must catch up: Having the technology is necessary but not sufficient. The mechanisms for deploying counter-drone systems safely in domestic airspace must evolve at the same pace as the technology itself.
Sources & References
- CNN – Surprise US Military Plans to Use Counter-Drone Laser Triggered Airspace Closure
- NBC News – El Paso Airport Grounding Was in Response to Testing of U.S. Military Technology
- CBS News – Airspace Closure Followed Spat Over Drone-Related Tests and Party Balloon Shoot-Down
- NPR – El Paso Airspace Closure Due to Use of U.S. Military Anti-Drone Technology
- Fox News – Mexican Cartel Drones Breach US Airspace Near El Paso
- CNBC – FAA Abruptly Halted El Paso Flights Over Defense Department’s Plans
- Al Jazeera – Why Was El Paso Airspace Shut Down?
- Newsweek – White House Issues Update on El Paso Air Space Closure
- AP / ABC News – How Mexican Cartels Employ Drones as Tools to Smuggle Drugs and Fight Enemies
- Border Report – Cartels Flew Drones 60,000 Times Along U.S. Border in Six-Month Period
- CSIS – Illicit Innovation: Latin America Is Not Prepared to Fight Criminal Drones
- Atlantic Council – Drug Cartels Are Adopting Cutting-Edge Drone Technology
- InSight Crime – Drones Fuel Criminal Arms Race in Latin America
- DroneXL – Cartels Deploy FPV Drones and Anti-UAS Systems
- Defense News – Army Readies to Launch 2026 Competition for Counter-Drone Laser Weapon
- DefenseScoop – Army Takes Another Step Toward Drone-Killing Laser Weapons
- DroneXL – DHS Creates Permanent Counter-Drone Office: $115 Million Announcement
- Inside Unmanned Systems – 2025 Proved the Case for Drone Defense
- Senate Judiciary Committee – Testimony of Steven Willoughby, DHS Counter-Drone Program (July 2025)
- Congressional Research Service – Department of Defense Counter-UAS: Background and Issues for Congress