Cuba in Crisis
Cuba in Crisis
A Comprehensive Assessment (January 2025 - January 2026)
Executive Summary
Cuba faces an unprecedented convergence of economic collapse, mass migration, military defeat in Venezuela, and escalating U.S. pressure. Over the past 12 months, the island has experienced a "free fall" economy with cumulative GDP contraction of 15% since 2019, annual inflation between 24-70%, and chronic electricity shortages consuming 10-20 hours daily. More than one million Cubans—approximately 10% of the population—have emigrated since 2021, with migration accelerating dramatically in 2025. The January 2026 U.S. military operation against Venezuela, which toppled President Nicolás Maduro, exposed Cuba's deep military and intelligence penetration of Venezuelan institutions and cut off critical oil supplies. The Trump administration has implemented a maximum pressure strategy targeting the regime through sanctions, designating Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, and strategically cutting Venezuelan oil while demanding Havana "make a deal before it's too late." While regime collapse remains unlikely in the near term due to repressive capacity and continuing migration as a safety valve, Cuba faces a humanitarian crisis with no apparent resolution short of political transformation.
1. Economic Collapse and Free Fall
Cuba's economy has entered what experts describe as a "free fall," marking one of the most severe economic crises since the post-Soviet "Special Period" of the 1990s. The island's GDP contracted by over 4% in 2025 alone, bringing the cumulative decline to approximately 15% over the past six years. Economists project that Cuba's economy has shrunk by 11% since 2019, with primary production sectors—including agriculture, livestock, and mining—experiencing a devastating 53% drop.
Inflation Crisis and Currency Collapse
The inflation crisis has spiraled out of control, with competing estimates placing annual inflation between 24% and 70% depending on methodology. The Cuban peso has collapsed on informal markets, trading at approximately 405 CUP per dollar by mid-2025, while the euro approached 450 CUP. Economist Pedro Monreal warned that "inflation has been climbing for five consecutive months, indicating a situation spinning out of control." Paradoxically, widespread poverty itself has become "the true factor restraining inflation," as Cubans are simply too impoverished to spend.
Electricity Crisis
The electricity crisis represents perhaps the most visible manifestation of economic collapse. Cuba is generating 25% less electricity than in 2019, with generation shortfalls exceeding 1,600-2,000 megawatts during peak demand—meaning more than half of national electricity needs go unmet. Multiple nationwide grid collapses occurred throughout 2025, with some regions experiencing blackouts lasting up to 20 hours daily. The eastern provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Holguín face the most severe conditions, while even Havana now regularly endures 8-10 hour daily outages.
2. Trade Collapse and Dependency Crisis
Cuba's trade situation has deteriorated dramatically, particularly following the January 2026 U.S. military operation that toppled Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Venezuela, which provided Cuba with subsidized oil for decades in exchange for medical personnel and security services, had already reduced its shipments significantly—from accounting for 47% of Cuba's trade in 2016 to just 10% in 2025. By 2025, Venezuela supplied only 15,000 barrels per day of crude to Cuba, down from 35,000 barrels quarterly at the start of the year.
Alternative Suppliers and Market Shifts
Mexico has emerged as Cuba's largest oil supplier, providing nearly 44% of Cuba's oil imports in 2025, compared to Venezuela's 34%. However, total crude and fuel imports plummeted by more than a third during the first ten months of 2025 compared to the previous year. China has become Cuba's top trading partner overall, primarily selling technology and equipment. Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to "elevate bilateral ties to a higher level" during President Díaz-Canel's September 2025 visit to Beijing, where eleven cooperation agreements were signed covering infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and Belt and Road Initiative projects.
Export Performance Collapse
Cuba's export performance has been disastrous. Exports reached only 62% of targets in the first half of 2025, falling from the already poor 78% achieved in the same period in 2024. Key export products—nickel, honey, charcoal, shrimp, and biopharmaceuticals—have all underperformed. Tourism arrivals through 2025 were down 72% compared to the previous year, with hotel occupancy at just 21.5%. The sugar industry, historically Cuba's leading agro-industry, has collapsed entirely, producing only 165,000 metric tons in the 2024-25 harvest—far below the millions once exported.
Medical missions once generated nearly €10 billion in export revenue in 2014, bringing in only approximately $4.9-5 billion in 2022. The Trump administration has implemented sanctions targeting Cuban medical missions, revoking visas of officials involved in these programs and attempting to discourage countries from hiring Cuban doctors.
3. Citizen Sentiment: Desperation, Migration, and Muted Protest
Cuban citizen sentiment is characterized by profound desperation, fear, and a mass exodus unprecedented in the nation's history. More than one million Cubans—nearly 10% of the population—have emigrated since the July 2021 protests. Cuba's official population fell below 10 million in 2024, dropping to 9,748,532 by December 31, 2024, representing a loss of 307,000 people in just 12 months. Independent demographer Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos estimates the true population may be as low as 8 million, suggesting a 24% decline since late 2020.
Migration as Exodus
This represents the largest migration wave since the Cuban Revolution, surpassing even the 1980 Mariel Boatlift's 125,000 departures. Between 2020 and 2024, Cuba lost 1.4 million residents, with 80% of emigrants aged 15-59. The exodus has created what researchers call a "polycrisis" with irreversible demographic consequences, as young Cubans increasingly view being born in Cuba as "the greatest misfortune that could have befallen them."
Limited Protest and Fear
Protests have continued throughout 2025, though on a smaller scale than the massive July 2021 demonstrations. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights documented approximately 290 protests between July 2024 and June 2025, primarily driven by blackouts, internet rate hikes, and deteriorating living conditions. December 2025 saw a new wave of pot-banging demonstrations in Havana neighborhoods including Marianao, Centro Habana, Alamar, Lawton, and La Lisa, with residents demanding electricity, food, and freedom. University students staged unusual protests over internet rate increases, though they carefully avoided labeling their actions as "protests" to minimize repression.
Despite widespread discontent, fear of repression prevents organized resistance. Over 650 protesters from the 2021 demonstrations remain imprisoned, with 101 sentenced to 10-22 years in prison. As one researcher noted, "people have lost hope. And when you have no hope, you lose the will to live, to do anything, even to rebel." Migration has become the primary response to crisis, serving as a "pressure valve" for the regime.
4. Relations with Allies: Deepening but Limited
Russia: Military Cooperation and Cuban Fighters in Ukraine
Russia and Cuba signed a military cooperation agreement in March 2025, ratified by the Russian parliament in October 2025. While the pact contains few operational details, it provides a legal framework for future military collaboration and has prompted speculation about potential Russian military deployments or arms supplies. Russia pledged $1 billion in economic aid to Cuba spanning through 2030, focusing on infrastructure and oil, though implementation is "taking time."
Most significantly, between 4,200 and 20,000 Cubans have been recruited to fight for Russia in Ukraine since 2022, with 39 confirmed deaths by September 2025. Ukrainian intelligence sources revealed that Russian military intelligence officers were given approval to recruit in Cuba, with recruits funneled through Belarus for training. U.S. officials warn that Cuban fighters are gaining combat experience against NATO-trained forces, acquiring knowledge of Russian tactics and weaponry that could be used to destabilize U.S. allies in Latin America.
Russia and Cuba are also collaborating on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and information technology platforms to achieve "technological independence" from Western systems. Cuba has joined the BRICS AI Alliance Network as an associate BRICS+ member.
China: Expanding Economic and Technology Partnership
China-Cuba relations have strengthened significantly, with both nations celebrating 65 years of diplomatic ties in 2025. During Díaz-Canel's September 2025 visit to Beijing, the countries issued a joint statement on "accelerating the building of the China-Cuba community with a shared future." China is providing crucial support for Cuba's energy transition, with "dozens of solar parks" set to be operational by 2025 as part of efforts to change Cuba's energy matrix.
Chinese tourism to Cuba increased by more than 50% in early 2025, and China was designated as the guest of honor at Cuba's May 2025 tourism fair. Trade and cooperation agreements span biotechnology, education, culture, sports, and commercial exchange. However, U.S. congressional committees have raised concerns about at least four Chinese-linked signals intelligence facilities in Cuba—at Bejucal, Wajay, Calabazar, and El Salao—showing signs of technical upgrades.
Venezuela: Catastrophic Disruption
The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela has been catastrophically disrupted by the January 3, 2026 U.S. military operation that captured President Nicolás Maduro. The operation exposed the depth of Cuban intelligence and military involvement in Venezuela when 32 Cuban military and intelligence personnel were killed defending Maduro at his residence. This marked the first time Cuba publicly acknowledged the extent of its security role in Venezuela.
For over two decades, Cuban advisors have been embedded throughout Venezuela's military and intelligence structures, including the civilian intelligence service SEBIN, military counterintelligence agency DGCIM, defense ministry, ports, airports, and national identification system. A 2019 Reuters investigation revealed that confidential 2008 agreements granted Cuba sweeping access to train Venezuelan troops, restructure intelligence agencies, and build internal surveillance systems. These Cuban advisors helped design and implement the repressive apparatus used against Venezuelan protesters in 2014, 2017, and subsequent years.
The new Venezuelan government under acting President Delcy Rodríguez faces U.S. demands to expel all Cuban, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian advisors. Venezuela has reaffirmed its "historic ties" with Cuba and stated it will maintain relations based on "solidarity and cooperation," though the practical sustainability of this position remains unclear.
5. Relations with Opponents: Maximum Pressure Returns
The Trump administration has implemented a comprehensive "maximum pressure" strategy against Cuba more aggressive than even the first Trump term. On his first day in office, January 20, 2025, President Trump reinstated Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, reversing President Biden's January 14, 2025 decision to remove the designation. This was the third time Cuba received this designation, following the original 1982 listing, Obama's 2015 removal, and Trump's January 2021 redesignation.
Sanctions Escalation: NSPM-5 and Restricted List
In June 2025, Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum NSPM-5, dramatically tightening sanctions. The memorandum prohibits direct or indirect financial transactions with entities controlled by Cuba's military, particularly Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) and its subsidiaries, which operate hotels, grocery stores, logistics operations, and service stations. The State Department expanded the Cuba Restricted List to include hundreds of additional entities and individuals, with Orbit S.A., a remittance-processing company, being the sole new addition in February 2025.
The policy includes:
- Mandatory record-keeping of all U.S. Cuba travel-related transactions for at least five years
- Regular Treasury Department audits of Cuba travel
- Restrictions on educational travel requiring U.S. citizen leadership
- Expanded visa restrictions covering ministers, vice ministers, senior officials, Supreme Court members, National Assembly members, provincial assembly members, and senior media professionals
- Opposition to lifting the embargo in international forums until a "transitional government" is established
Travel Ban and Migration Restrictions
A travel ban implemented in June 2025 severely restricts Cuban entry to the United States, citing Cuba's status as a state sponsor of terrorism, failure to share law enforcement information, refusal to accept deportees, and high visa overstay rates. The Trump administration has also shut down most legal pathways for Cuban migration, including suspending the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program.
The economic impact has been severe. The Cuban government estimates U.S. sanctions cost the country more than $7.5 billion between March 2024 and February 2025 alone. The U.S. government "significantly tightened its economic sanctions against Cuba in January 2025, orienting around a 'total pressure' or 'maximum pressure' strategy."
6. Military and Clandestine Activities
Cuba's military and intelligence activities in other countries have been dramatically exposed by the January 2026 Venezuela operation. The death of 32 Cuban security personnel protecting Maduro revealed that Cuba had effectively assumed responsibility for presidential security in Venezuela—an unprecedented transfer of sovereignty in the region's recent history. Former Venezuelan officials and international investigations have documented Cuban advisors operating across Venezuela's most sensitive institutions for over two decades.
Cuban intelligence personnel supervised interrogations, taught psychological torture methods, and provided digital surveillance training to Venezuelan security forces. They controlled communications, vetted leadership, and designed propaganda and disinformation strategies. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela reported that a 2008 memorandum of understanding provided for Cuban oversight in restructuring Venezuelan military intelligence, including creating new agencies, training counterintelligence officers, and providing surveillance and infiltration techniques.
Beyond Venezuela, 4,200-20,000 Cubans are fighting for Russia in Ukraine, providing combat experience that could be "transferred" to train proxies and destabilize other regions, especially in Latin America. Ukrainian officials warn that "the combat experience that Cuban nationals acquire in Ukraine is a dangerous and transferable asset."
Cuba has also advanced its cybersecurity and artificial intelligence capabilities through partnerships with Russia, China, and Vietnam. Officials claim Cuba is now "far ahead of most countries in the region" on cybersecurity, having developed its own "CuCERT" system after being excluded from international cooperation. The Faculty of Cybersecurity at the University of Computer Sciences (UCI) is producing large numbers of graduates for government agencies and developing private sector applications.
7. Impact of U.S. Activity in Venezuela
The U.S. military operation against Venezuela represents an existential crisis for Cuba. As Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez stated, "The overthrow of Maduro places us in a critical existential predicament for our survival as sovereign nations." The immediate impacts include:
Oil Supply Disruption
No Venezuelan oil shipments have departed for Cuba since the January 3 operation. Trump explicitly declared "THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA - ZERO!" This cuts off a critical energy source for an island already experiencing severe electricity shortages.
Loss of Strategic Partnership
Venezuela's economic support sustained Cuba through decades of crisis. The relationship provided not just oil, but also an ideological alliance and political cover in international forums. With Maduro's ouster, Cuba has lost its most important ally in the hemisphere.
Exposure of Security Role
The death of 32 Cuban security personnel defending Maduro publicly revealed the extent of Cuban military and intelligence penetration in Venezuela—information that had been documented by investigations but never officially acknowledged. This exposure validates U.S. claims about Cuban "malign influence" and provides justification for further pressure.
Economic Multiplier Effects
Venezuela's crisis compounds Cuba's existing challenges. Combined with U.S. seizures of Venezuelan oil tankers and the effective U.S. oil blockade, Cuba faces severe fuel shortages that cascade through the entire economy—reducing electricity generation, hampering transportation, limiting agricultural production, and forcing industry shutdowns.
Strategic Isolation
The Trump administration is using Venezuela as leverage to demand Cuba make "a deal" before it's "too late." Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Cuban leaders they should be "worried" and are "in a lot of trouble." However, no clear negotiating framework has emerged, and Cuban President Díaz-Canel has responded defiantly, stating "Nobody dictates what we do."
Some observers believe the Venezuela operation was designed specifically to pressure Cuba. As one Fortune analysis noted, "If the administration has its way, 2026 will be the final year of communist rule in Cuba – and it intends to achieve this without intervention by U.S. armed forces." Trump himself stated, "Cuba looks like it's ready to fall" and "I don't think we need any action."
8. Likely Future U.S. Actions
Multiple indicators suggest the Trump administration intends to maintain and potentially escalate pressure on Cuba throughout 2026:
Regime Change Strategy
Senior Republican lawmakers, including Senator Rick Scott, predict the Cuban government will fall in 2026 or 2027. The administration appears committed to economic strangulation as its primary tool, believing oil cutoffs and maximum pressure will trigger either popular uprising or internal regime fracture.
Continued Sanctions Escalation
The June 2025 National Security Memorandum requires ongoing agency reviews to "adjust current regulations relating to transactions with Cuba." This suggests further tightening is planned, potentially including:
- Additional entities added to the Cuba Restricted List
- Expanded secondary sanctions targeting third-country companies doing business with Cuban military enterprises
- Further restrictions on remittances (already facing new controls through Orbit S.A. designation)
- Increased enforcement of travel ban provisions
Pressure on Mexican Oil Supplies
Republicans have "long urged Mexico to halt oil shipments to Cuba." With Venezuela effectively out of the equation, Mexico's continued oil sales to Cuba may become a bilateral irritant. The Trump administration's simultaneous threats against Mexico over cartel operations could create leverage for demanding Mexico cease Cuba support.
Diplomatic Isolation Efforts
The administration will likely continue pressing allies to reduce engagement with Cuba, particularly:
- Lobbying against Cuba's participation in international organizations
- Pressuring countries to reject Cuban medical missions through visa sanctions
- Opposing international calls to lift the embargo
Intelligence Operations
The U.S. may increase intelligence activities aimed at identifying regime vulnerabilities, supporting internal opposition, or encouraging defections. The January 2026 defection of Cuban Vice Minister Juan Carlos Santana Novoa while on official travel demonstrates potential cracks in regime loyalty.
Military Posture
While Trump has stated military intervention is unnecessary, the administration maintains significant military presence in the region following the Venezuela operation. Naval forces remain off Venezuela's coast, and the U.S. military demonstrated willingness to conduct operations in the Caribbean basin. This serves as implicit threat even without direct Cuba military action.
Migration Pressure as Leverage
The administration has closed most legal migration pathways while simultaneously implementing policies (maximum pressure sanctions, oil cutoffs) that worsen conditions driving Cubans to flee. This creates a deliberate crisis that could be used to negotiate broader regime change or reforms.
No Clear Off-Ramp
Critically, the administration has articulated no clear conditions under which pressure would be relieved short of regime change. Trump's demand that Cuba "make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE" contains no specifics about what terms would be acceptable. This suggests the goal is collapse rather than negotiated transition.
9. Outlook and Constraints
Several factors constrain the likelihood of near-term Cuban regime collapse despite severe pressure:
Repressive Capacity
The Cuban security apparatus remains intact, with over 650 political prisoners still detained and active surveillance of dissidents. Fear prevents organized opposition, with Cubans choosing emigration over resistance.
No Organized Opposition
Unlike Venezuela, where María Corina Machado led a coordinated opposition movement, Cuba lacks any comparable organizational structure. The Catholic Church shows "little ability or inclination" to play an organizing role.
Historical Resilience
As former U.S. official Roberta Jacobson noted, "What we observe in Cuba suggests there seems to be no limit to how dire the situation can become without an uprising." The regime survived the 1990s Special Period, and predictions of imminent collapse have proven repeatedly incorrect.
Alternative Support
While limited, Russia and China continue providing some economic support. Russia's $1 billion pledge and China's infrastructure investments, though insufficient to reverse decline, may prevent total collapse.
Migration as Safety Valve
The exodus of over one million people removes the most dissatisfied citizens who might otherwise fuel unrest. As long as emigration remains possible (even through irregular channels), pressure for internal change is reduced.
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