The Pentagon Is Testing a Havana Syndrome Device. Its Own Spy Agencies Say There Isn’t One.

The Pentagon Is Testing a Havana Syndrome Device. Its Own Spy Agencies Say There Isn’t One.

LodiEye - October 2026

Summary

In late 2016, intelligence officers at the newly reopened U.S. embassy in Havana began reporting a strange sequence: a sudden, localized sound or a feeling of pressure, usually at night in their homes, followed by headaches, dizziness, ringing in the ears and trouble concentrating. Over the next five years similar reports came from Guangzhou, Moscow, Vienna, Berlin, Tbilisi, Hanoi, Bogotá, New Delhi and Washington itself. The government calls them anomalous health incidents. The public calls them Havana Syndrome.

Ten years on, three records sit side by side and do not agree. The medical record says the symptoms are real and often disabling, but that brain scans show no injury. The scientific record says pulsed radio-frequency energy is the most plausible external cause, but no device has ever been tied to an incident. The intelligence record is formally split: five agencies say foreign involvement is very unlikely, two dissent, and a House subcommittee says the majority finding was engineered.^[1][5]

Two things changed in 2026. The Pentagon has spent more than a year testing a pulsed radio-frequency device that the government bought covertly for an eight-figure sum, and in July it renamed its task force the Directed Energy Bio-Effects team and issued its first compensation payments. Meanwhile Canadian diplomats whose children fell ill in Havana are pressing Ottawa for an inquiry.^[9][10][16]

Where things stand

Roughly 1,500 reports were logged across U.S. agencies between 2016 and 2022. Most were later attributed to ordinary medical or environmental causes. A few dozen remain unexplained. No unclassified intelligence assessment has been issued since January 2025, and the Pentagon's device tests have not been made public.

How it unfolded

The incidents began in Havana, spread to roughly a dozen countries by 2021, and fell off sharply after the March 2023 intelligence assessment. One investigative team argues the first case actually dates to Frankfurt in 2014.^[7]

Late 2016

CIA officers at the Havana embassy report sound and pressure events at their residences and, later, at the Hotel Nacional and Hotel Capri.

Spring 2017

Canadian embassy families in Havana begin reporting symptoms; 14 Canadians, including children, are eventually affected.^[17]

Aug–Oct 2017

The State Department discloses the incidents, cuts embassy staff by about 60 percent and expels 15 Cuban diplomats.

Dec 2017

CIA officer Marc Polymeropoulos is struck in a Moscow hotel room; he later retires early with chronic migraines.

Spring 2018

A second cluster at the U.S. consulate in Guangzhou, China. Consular staff are evacuated; a visiting civilian, one officer's mother, also falls ill.

2019–2020

Reports in the United States: FBI and CIA personnel in Virginia and Florida, and a National Security Council staffer near the White House in November 2020.

Dec 2020

A National Academies committee concludes directed, pulsed radio-frequency energy is the most plausible mechanism for the early cases.

2021

The largest wave: Vienna, Berlin, Geneva, Belgrade, Paris, London, Bogotá, Hanoi, New Delhi, Taipei. A Hanoi case delays Vice President Harris; Bogotá cases precede a Blinken visit. The HAVANA Act is signed in October.

Mar 2023

The intelligence community assesses foreign involvement as very unlikely. New reports drop sharply afterward.^[2]

Mar 2024

NIH publishes two JAMA studies finding no MRI-detectable brain injury. The same month, The Insider, 60 Minutes and Der Spiegel place Russian GRU operatives at incident sites in Tbilisi and Frankfurt.^[6][7]

Dec 2024

A House Intelligence subcommittee says it is increasingly likely a foreign adversary is behind some cases and that the intelligence community impeded its investigation.^[4]

Jan 2025

Updated intelligence assessment: five agencies hold at very unlikely, two shift toward a foreign device.^[1]

Jan 2026

CNN reports the Pentagon has been testing a covertly purchased pulsed radio-frequency device for more than a year.^[9]

Jul 2026

The Pentagon issues nearly $3 million in first payments and renames its task force the Directed Energy Bio-Effects Cross-Functional Team.^[10]

Sep–Oct 2026

Canadian diplomats say their children still suffer; former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton says neither country properly investigated the Russia allegations.^[16][18]

Cities with first-reported incidents, by year

Source: LodiEye tally of locations named in public reporting and the Pentagon's list of affected postings. Counts are approximate; several posts have never been publicly confirmed.^[11]

Who was affected

The affected population is almost entirely U.S. and Canadian government personnel and their families, concentrated in roles a hostile intelligence service would have reason to target. That concentration is the strongest argument for an external cause. The absence of a single confirmed case outside government is the fact skeptics cite in reply.

• CIA officers in Havana, Moscow, Vienna, Tbilisi, Belgrade, Hanoi and New Delhi. The first Havana patient was a CIA officer.
• State Department diplomats and families in Havana, Guangzhou, Tbilisi and Vienna. Two Guangzhou officers, Mark Lenzi and Catherine Werner, went public after being evacuated.
• FBI agents, including counterintelligence personnel working Russian cases, at home and abroad.
• Defense Department staff, including a senior official at the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius.^[12]
• White House staff. Olivia Troye, a former homeland security adviser to Vice President Pence, has described two episodes on the grounds.
• Children. The only cohort of children evaluated for brain injury is Canadian. No U.S. study of children has been published.

Two patterns bear on the question of cause. The early Havana cases skewed toward intelligence officers rather than consular or administrative staff, which a random environmental cause would not produce. And 2021 incidents clustered around high-level travel, which reads either as targeting or as heightened reporting under heightened attention. Both readings are on the record and neither has been settled.

What the doctors found

The clinical picture has been consistent since 2017: an abrupt onset event, then vestibular and cognitive symptoms, with a subset becoming chronic. Treatment has been symptomatic throughout because no mechanism has been established.

The first evaluations, at the University of Miami in 2017, found balance and cognitive abnormalities but no hearing-loss pattern consistent with sound exposure. The University of Pennsylvania's brain-injury center described 21 Havana patients in JAMA in 2018 as having a concussion-like condition without any head trauma, and in 2019 reported differences on MRI. Both Penn papers drew criticism for small samples and the lack of pre-exposure baselines. Canadian families, unable to get answers at home, flew to Penn on their own.^[19]

The definitive dataset is the National Institutes of Health study, which ran for nearly five years and was published as two JAMA papers in March 2024. The imaging study compared 81 people reporting incidents against 48 matched controls and found no significant differences in brain volume, structure or function after statistical correction. The clinical study compared 86 against 30 and found no biomarker differences. About 28 percent of the affected group were diagnosed with persistent postural-perceptual dizziness, a balance disorder in which brain networks that process position stop communicating properly, usually after a triggering event. The group also reported more fatigue, post-traumatic stress symptoms and depression.^[6][20]

NIH study enrollment, 2018–2024

Source: NIH Clinical Center findings published in JAMA, March 2024. Scans were taken a median 80 days after symptom onset.^[6]

The NIH study was not designed to test whether a weapon caused the symptoms, and its authors said so. Critics, including Stanford's David Relman, noted that 80 days is long enough for transient injury to resolve and that conventional MRI may not detect the kind of damage pulsed energy would cause. An internal NIH review later found some participants felt pressured to enroll, and the study was paused.

The balance-disorder finding is cited by both camps. It is real, disabling and treatable, and it is compatible with both an external trigger and a stress-related one.

The counting problem

The most consequential dispute in the record is administrative: who decided which reports counted, and by what criteria. Every intelligence assessment leans on the resulting small number of unexplained cases.

By early 2022 the government had logged roughly 1,000 reports; by late 2022 about 1,500 across all agencies. The CIA's January 2022 interim review attributed the large majority to pre-existing conditions, environmental factors or stress, leaving about two dozen unexplained. That same year the State Department and the interagency adopted a stricter case definition built around the acute onset: a sudden, localized sensory event with a directional quality, followed by symptoms, with no alternative explanation. Reports lacking the acute event were reclassified.

Advocates argue this excluded people who were asleep or did not register the onset, and that the smaller count was then used to argue no pattern existed. The House subcommittee says irregularities in medical-related processes are part of what it is investigating.^[5] Three groups fall outside every tally: dependents who were never formally evaluated, personnel who did not report for career reasons, and non-U.S. staff.

A cause that acts on a few dozen people looks like an attack. A cause that acts on 1,500 looks like something in the environment or the reporting process. The number is not a neutral fact. It is the product of decisions that remain largely classified.

Four explanations

Pulsed radio-frequency energy is the only external mechanism that expert panels have rated plausible. Functional illness is the only explanation that fits the full 1,500-report population.

Competing hypotheses

Hypothesis	Supporting evidence	Main objection	Status
Sonic or acoustic weapon	Victims heard sounds; early State Department framing.	Audible sound cannot injure the brain. Havana recordings were identified as the call of a Caribbean cricket.	Abandoned by 2018.
Pulsed radio-frequency energy	The microwave auditory effect has been documented since 1961. National Academies (2020) and an ODNI expert panel (2022) rated it most plausible for the early cases.	No device captured; no signal recorded at any incident. Whether pulses can injure tissue without heating is contested.	Leading external hypothesis. The Pentagon's 2026 team is named for it.
Pesticides	A 2019 Canadian study found brain changes consistent with organophosphate exposure from mosquito fumigation in Havana.	Does not explain cases outside Cuba or the sudden directional onset.	Open for Havana only.
Functional or psychogenic illness	NIH found no structural injury and a high rate of the balance disorder. Reporting surged after warnings and fell after the 2023 assessment.	Does not explain the first Havana cases, which preceded any warning, or the concentration among intelligence officers.	Favored by the intelligence majority and much of the neurology literature.

Source: National Academies, ODNI, NIH/JAMA, and the neurology review literature.

The physics behind the leading hypothesis is settled in one respect and open in another. Short, high-power radio pulses create tiny pressure waves in the skull that are perceived as clicks or buzzing. That is the microwave auditory effect, discovered by radar technicians in the 1940s and formalized by Allan Frey in 1961. Producing a perceived sound at a distance is within reach of a portable device. Producing tissue injury by heating takes far more energy and leaves burns that these patients do not have. Whether high-peak, low-average pulses can damage the inner ear or brain through mechanical stress without heating is the unresolved question, and no human data exist because no one has deliberately exposed people at those parameters.

The mechanism debate is unresolved because the two best datasets point different ways. The clinical history of the first cases fits an external trigger. The population-level data fit a functional explanation. Both can be true if the early cases were real attacks and the later wave mostly was not.

What the intelligence agencies concluded

The intelligence record moved from targeted attacks, in Secretary Tillerson's 2017 words, to very unlikely foreign involvement in 2023, to a formal split in 2025.

The March 2023 assessment had five agencies judging that available intelligence consistently points against adversary involvement, and that there was no credible evidence a foreign adversary has a weapon or collection device causing the incidents.^[2][3] The January 2025 update kept five agencies at very unlikely but recorded two dissents: one agency judged a roughly even chance that a foreign actor had used a novel device to harm a small subset of personnel, and another judged it likely a foreign actor has a radio-frequency capability that could cause the reported effects, though unlikely it was deployed in any reported case. Both dissents were low confidence.^[1]

The majority relies on sensitive reporting that adversaries appeared surprised by the incidents or denied involvement in private communications, and on the judgment that an adversary would use well-established mechanisms rather than a novel weapon. A CIA spokesperson has said Director Burns initially believed Russia was responsible before the agency's task force changed his view.^[13]

The case for a foreign actor

• Early victims were disproportionately intelligence officers.
• Two victims identified GRU operatives at incident sites years and a thousand miles apart.
• Two intelligence agencies shifted toward a device in 2025.
• The Pentagon bought and is testing a pulsed radio-frequency device.
• A House subcommittee says the 2023 assessment lacked analytic integrity.

The case against

• No signal has been recorded at any incident despite monitoring.
• No device has been tied to any incident.
• NIH found no structural brain injury.
• Adversaries appeared surprised in intercepted communications.
• Reports fell sharply once the government stopped signaling concern.

The House Intelligence Committee's CIA Subcommittee, led by Rep. Rick Crawford, released an unclassified interim report in December 2024 saying it had found reliable evidence that some incidents are the work of foreign adversaries, that the intelligence community impeded its investigation, and that the 2023 assessment was produced in a manner inconsistent with analytic integrity. Committee Democrats called the report sloppy and said it was released without being shared with them. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said the intelligence community disagreed with many of its findings. A classified companion report was being finalized.^[4][14]

The Russian thread

The strongest public attribution work is a yearlong investigation by The Insider, 60 Minutes and Der Spiegel, published March 31, 2024. It placed operatives of GRU Unit 29155, the Russian military intelligence unit behind the 2018 Skripal poisoning and a string of sabotage operations in Europe, at the scene of incidents in Tbilisi and Frankfurt.^[7]

Travel logs and phone metadata placed the son of the unit's commander in Tbilisi at the time of 2021 incidents against U.S. embassy staff. Two victims, eight years and a thousand miles apart, identified unit members from photographs, one in Tbilisi and one in Frankfurt. Seven alleged unit members were tracked across Europe in the days before previously unreported incidents. The investigation also surfaced a Russian military document from around 2013 describing research on non-lethal acoustic weapons.^[8]

The intelligence community has not endorsed the attribution; the 2025 assessment postdates it and still has five agencies at very unlikely. Skeptics note that Unit 29155 operatives travel constantly, that photo identification years after the fact is unreliable, and that a working weapon in Russian hands since 2014 would likely have been used at scale rather than sparingly against mid-level personnel. Victims' advocates reply that the case-definition change removed incidents before attribution analysis began, and that the agencies most hostile to the attack theory had the most to lose from admitting their officers were targeted for years without a response.

Russia remains the only state for which named operatives have been placed at incident sites. China has been raised because of Guangzhou and later reports from Taiwan, but no public evidence ties either to a device.

The Moscow precedent

There is one documented case of an adversary irradiating American diplomats. From 1953 to 1976 the Soviet Union beamed microwaves at the U.S. embassy in Moscow from an apartment building about 100 meters away, striking the west face of the chancery most intensely between the third and eighth floors. The most accepted explanation is that the beams powered or triggered listening devices inside the building. The State Department commissioned a Johns Hopkins epidemiologist, Abraham Lilienfeld, to compare 1,827 Moscow employees and their dependents against 2,561 at other Eastern European posts. His 1978 report found no difference in mortality, cancer or consistent illness.^[21][22]

Both sides cite it. It shows Soviet intelligence was willing to irradiate an embassy for decades. It also shows that continuous low-level exposure produced nothing like the acute onset of the Havana cases, which means any external cause would have to be a different kind of signal.

The technologies that exist

Separating what is documented from what is inferred matters here. Eight physical mechanisms have been proposed or are worth ruling out.

Directed-energy mechanisms and their fit

Mechanism	Fit with reported onset	Documented systems	Verdict
Pulsed radio-frequency (microwave)	Good: sudden, directional, localized; works through walls at tens of meters.	Soviet and Russian research; the U.S. Navy's MEDUSA project (2003–2008); the device the Pentagon is testing.	Leading external hypothesis.
Millimeter wave	Poor: energy stops in the skin; causes pain, not vestibular symptoms.	U.S. Active Denial System, demonstrated 2007.	Ruled out for these cases; the most mature directed-energy weapon class.
Focused ultrasound	Moderate: can affect balance; needs close range and a clear path.	Clinical devices approved for tremor treatment.	Secondary candidate for residence incidents.
Parametric ultrasound	Explains a localized sound, not injury.	Commercial directional speakers.	Could explain some sound reports.
Infrasound	Symptoms fit; cannot be aimed.	Industrial machinery, building systems.	Plausible non-attack explanation for some clusters; never systematically excluded at the Havana sites.
Magnetic stimulation	Poor: requires a coil within centimeters of the head.	Clinical TMS.	Ruled out.
Lasers	Poor: eye and skin injury only.	Dazzlers; Chinese lasers injured U.S. aircrew in Djibouti in 2018.	Ruled out for these cases; proven state use against U.S. personnel.
Surveillance-device side effect	Moderate: explains clustering at intelligence officers' homes and why adversaries denied an attack.	Not documented publicly.	Underexplored; reframes attribution as negligence rather than attack.

Source: National Academies (2020), ODNI expert panel (2022), U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory bioeffects literature.

The U.S. government has studied what pulsed radio energy does to tissue for seventy years, mostly in the open, because it needed exposure standards for its own radar and radio operators. The Air Force Research Laboratory's bioeffects program at Fort Sam Houston produced the dose models behind current safety limits and tested the Active Denial System on volunteers. The Navy funded MEDUSA, a project to weaponize the microwave auditory effect for crowd control, and dropped it as impractical. The record establishes that the United States believed the effect was weaponizable and tried.

The last row of the table is worth a second look. The 2023 assessment's own phrase was “weapon or collection device.” The intelligence community took seriously the possibility that victims were collateral to a radio-frequency intelligence-collection tool aimed at phones or rooms rather than people. That would explain why incidents clustered at intelligence officers' residences, why no adversary admitted an attack in private communications, and why the sensation stopped when the target moved. It has received little public attention.

The evidentiary gap

No incident has a recorded radio-frequency signature, despite monitoring equipment installed at U.S. posts after 2017. That absence is the hardest fact for the attack hypothesis to explain, and the most productive question for anyone covering the story to put to the agencies.

Radio energy leaves no residue. It is detectable only in real time, and a pulsed signal with high peak and low average power is easy to miss with equipment set for average power. Whether any monitor logged an event during a reported incident has never been stated publicly. There is also no accepted dose metric for non-thermal pulsed effects, which means no one can say what exposure would be needed to cause these symptoms, and therefore what a detector should be set to catch. The Pentagon's testing of the purchased device is the first opportunity to measure a candidate device's output against a human exposure model.

The asymmetry runs both ways. The attack hypothesis needs one captured signal or one device tied to one incident, and has neither after nine years. The functional-illness hypothesis needs to explain the first Havana cases, which preceded any warning or priming, and has not. Both sides are arguing from absence.

What changed in 2026

In January, CNN reported that Homeland Security Investigations had bought a device for an eight-figure sum in the final days of the Biden administration, with Defense Department funding, and that the Pentagon had been testing it for more than a year. The device produces pulsed radio waves. Debate and skepticism continue inside government over whether it has anything to do with the unexplained incidents, and it was not clear how the government learned the device existed.^[9]

In February the Pentagon restructured its task force to turn findings into treatments and countermeasures more quickly.^[11] On July 10 it renamed the team the Directed Energy Bio-Effects Cross-Functional Team, with a stated focus on non-kinetic threats, and announced it had paid nearly $3 million in compensation, the first Defense Department payments under the 2021 HAVANA Act.^[10][15] The name commits the Pentagon to a working hypothesis that the intelligence majority still rates very unlikely.

In Canada, eight former diplomats told Global News that they and their families, including children, suffered headaches, nosebleeds and loss of consciousness while posted in Havana from 2017, that children now have learning disabilities their parents attribute to the incidents, and that there has been no follow-up on the children. Ottawa stands by its 2024 report, which found no definitive common cause.^[16] In early October, John Bolton, who was U.S. National Security Adviser during the 2018 and 2019 wave, told the Globe and Mail that neither Canada nor the United States properly investigated the Russia allegations.^[18]

Compensation and classification

The HAVANA Act, signed in October 2021, authorizes one-time payments to employees, former employees and dependents with qualifying brain injuries incurred on or after January 1, 2016. The CIA and State Department began paying in 2022. The Pentagon did not begin reviewing applications until July 2025 and did not pay until July 2026. Canada has no compensation program; the diplomats' $28 million lawsuit, filed in 2019, is the only avenue.^[15][17]

The condition has no diagnostic code. It is not recognized in the International Classification of Diseases and is not a disease recognized by the medical community. That means veterans' disability ratings must be assigned under existing codes such as migraine or vestibular disorder, which cap benefits below what a traumatic brain injury rating would allow; workers' compensation requires a diagnosis; and any future count depends on a case definition that is administrative rather than clinical. The Government Accountability Office found in July 2024 that the Pentagon's coordination of care was inadequate and that affected personnel struggled to get through the military health system.^[23]

For readers here

No case has been reported in San Joaquin County, and nothing in this record suggests one. The story matters locally for two narrower reasons. The HAVANA Act covers any federal employee or dependent, including people from this region who serve overseas, and the Pentagon's new program is the first attempt at prevention rather than response. And the way the government counted, reclassified and compensated these cases is a working example of how a case definition, set administratively and out of public view, determines who gets care. That pattern is not unique to this story.

What remains open

• Whether any radio-frequency monitor at any post recorded a signal during a reported incident.
• How the roughly 1,500 reports were triaged, under what written criteria, and how many were reclassified in 2022.
• What the Pentagon's testing of the purchased device has shown, and who built it.
• Which two agencies dissented in January 2025, and whether their shift followed the device acquisition.
• What is in the House subcommittee's classified report.
• Whether any child of a U.S. employee has been evaluated or compensated.
• Whether Canada's promised child assessments took place.
• How many HAVANA Act claims each agency has paid and denied, and on what criteria.

If a portable device can produce disabling neurological symptoms through walls without leaving evidence, it is a counterintelligence problem at every overseas post. If it cannot, then several hundred people have been diagnosed, compensated and in some cases retired on the strength of a mechanism that does not exist, and the government has no good account of what happened to them. Either answer has consequences for how the next cluster, wherever it occurs, gets handled.

About This Report

LodiEye is the original civic-reporting and analysis arm of Lodi411.com, a citizen-run civic data and transparency platform serving Lodi, California and San Joaquin County. LodiEye gathers information of public interest, applies editorial judgment to public records, meetings, and data, and publishes original explanatory reporting for its readers — the work of a newsroom, and a representative of the news media as that term is defined under federal law. Our reporting emphasizes primary sources, public data, and full source transparency so readers can check every claim. LodiEye complements, and does not replace, the other outlets covering this region; for additional reporting on Lodi, San Joaquin County, and the broader region, we also encourage readers to consult the Lodi News-Sentinel, Stocktonia, The Sacramento Bee, CalMatters, and other established news organizations. Our full editorial standards and news-media-status statement is published at lodi411.com/editorial-standards.

This LodiEye report was produced using artificial intelligence tools under the direction and review of the founder. Lodi411 uses multiple AI platforms in its research and publication workflow, including Anthropic’s Claude (primarily Opus and Sonnet models) and Perplexity AI across a variety of large language models offered by each. These tools were used in the following capacities:

Source Discovery: AI-assisted search and retrieval located the declassified intelligence assessments of 2023 and 2025, the House Intelligence subcommittee's interim report, the NIH findings published in JAMA, Global Affairs Canada's report, the 1978 Moscow embassy health study, the Joint Force Quarterly review, and reporting by CNN, DefenseScoop, The Insider, Voice of America, Global News and the Globe and Mail.

Credibility Validation: Each claim was sorted by who made it and what supports it. Findings from the intelligence community, Congress, the NIH and the Cuban Academy of Sciences are presented as the positions of those bodies. The Insider's attribution work is presented as investigative reporting that the intelligence community has not endorsed. Figures that rest on press accounts rather than primary documents are identified as approximate.

Analysis and Synthesis: AI tools helped organize a decade of medical, scientific, intelligence and congressional material into a single account, and helped identify where the three records agree and where they do not.

Presentation: AI tools assisted with drafting, the tables, the timeline, the two charts and the HTML layout of this page.

Final Review: The founder reviewed the report for accuracy, tone and local relevance before publication.

Lodi411 describes its methods so readers can judge the work for themselves. Corrections and clarifications are welcome at editor@lodi411.com.

References

1. Primary Office of the Director of National Intelligence — Updated Assessment of Anomalous Health Incidents, approved for release Jan. 9, 2025.
2. Primary National Intelligence Council — Updated Assessment of Anomalous Health Incidents, March 1, 2023 (Federation of American Scientists mirror).
3. News Homeland Security Today — Intelligence agencies find it unlikely a foreign adversary caused Havana Syndrome cases, March 2023.
4. Primary House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence — CIA Subcommittee interim report release, Dec. 5, 2024.
5. Primary House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence — Chairman Crawford op-ed, “We Have Been Misled on Havana Syndrome,” December 2024.
6. Medical Applied Radiology — NIH finds no MRI-detectable brain injury in people with Havana Syndrome, March 2024 (summarizing JAMA, doi 10.1001/jama.2024.2413 and 10.1001/jama.2024.2424).
7. Investigative The Insider, with 60 Minutes and Der Spiegel — “Unraveling Havana Syndrome,” March 31, 2024.
8. News The Debrief — Investigation links Unit 29155 to Havana Syndrome attacks, April 2024.
9. News CNN — Pentagon bought device through undercover operation some investigators suspect is linked to Havana Syndrome, Jan. 13, 2026.
10. News DefenseScoop — Pentagon disburses Havana Syndrome compensation, rebrands team focused on Directed Energy Bio-Effects, July 13, 2026.
11. News DefenseScoop — Pentagon eyes treatments and countermeasures as it reshapes AHI cross-functional team, Feb. 24, 2026.
12. News Military.com/dpa — Pentagon confirms senior official experienced symptoms at the Vilnius NATO summit, April 2, 2024.
13. News Sasha Ingber — A war of words between the intel agencies and Havana Syndrome victims, January 2025.
14. News Voice of America — Renewed concerns that U.S. adversary behind Havana Syndrome, Dec. 5, 2024.
15. News DefenseScoop — Pentagon reviewing payment applications from Havana Syndrome victims, July 14, 2025.
16. News Global News — Canadian diplomats react to Global Affairs statement on Havana Syndrome, 2026.
17. News The Globe and Mail — Cuba diplomats launch suit alleging Ottawa failed to address Havana Syndrome, February 2019.
18. News Encyclopaedia Britannica — Havana syndrome entry, with Globe and Mail news items of Sept. 28, Oct. 2 and Oct. 5, 2026.
19. News CTV News — Trudeau says diplomats in Cuba suffered real health problems, February 2019.
20. News Associated Press — New study finds no brain injuries among Havana syndrome patients, March 18, 2024.
21. Medical Elwood, J.M. — Microwaves in the cold war: the Moscow embassy study and its interpretation, Environmental Health, 2012.
22. Primary Lilienfeld et al. — Evaluation of Health Status of Foreign Service and Other Employees from Selected Eastern European Posts, 1978 (NTIS PB288163).
23. Primary House Committee on Oversight — Letter to the Department of Defense on anomalous health incidents, citing GAO-24-106593, Feb. 20, 2025.