Trump's Strategic Options — Costs, Outcomes & Global Economic Consequences
Strait of Hormuz
CLOSED
Since March 4, 2026
Bab al-Mandeb
AT RISK
Houthis entered war Mar. 29
Brent Crude
~$110–$126
Pre-war: ~$70/bbl
US KIA / WIA
13 / 300
As of March 31
Iran Tanker Attacks
21+
Since Feb. 28
Trump Timeline
4–6 Wks
Mid-April target cited by WH
Section I
The Strategic Situation
Operation Epic Fury — the joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran — began February 28, 2026,
achieving significant tactical objectives: Iran's nuclear program severely degraded, Supreme Leader
Khamenei killed, and Iran's navy and missile stockpiles substantially depleted. However, the campaign
triggered Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz — the world's most critical oil shipping chokepoint —
producing what the IEA calls "the greatest global energy security challenge in history."
As the conflict enters its second month, a new variable has emerged: Yemen's Houthi movement formally
entered the war on March 29, threatening to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — the only remaining viable
bypass route for Gulf oil. The coexistence of a closed Hormuz and a threatened Bab al-Mandeb is a
scenario for which the global economy has no adequate contingency.
The Core Dilemma: The US has achieved military dominance but not strategic resolution.
Iran retains physical control of the Strait. The Houthis now threaten the only partial bypass. Trump's
4–6 week timeline is expiring. The White House has signaled willingness to exit without reopening Hormuz
— with profound consequences for allies, oil markets, and American credibility.
Nuclear Program
DEGRADED
Netanyahu: "beyond halfway"
Iranian Leadership
FRACTURED
IRGC command decapitated
Oil Bypass Capacity
3.5–5.5M bbl/d
vs. 20M normal Hormuz flow
Daily Disruption
~14.5–16.5M bbl
Net after pipeline bypass
Houthi Status
ACTIVE
Bab al-Mandeb threatened
IEA Emergency Release
400M bbl
~20 days of Hormuz flows
Section II
Deployed Force Assets — What Trump Has to Work With
The largest US Middle East deployment since the 2003 Iraq invasion, with 120+ aircraft — the biggest
surge of US airpower in the region in over two decades. These assets define what is militarily
feasible.
Naval / Amphibious
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Strike Group — Arabian Sea
USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group — Arabian Sea
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) — Atlantic, deployment imminent
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) — San Diego, preparing
Ohio-class SSGNs: up to 4 × 154 Tomahawks each
USS Tripoli ARG + 31st MEU (~3,500 Marines) — arrived Mar. 27
USS Boxer ARG — en route as relief
GARC uncrewed drone boats — first confirmed combat use
⚠ MCM gap: only 4 Avenger minesweepers remain; all in Japan
Ground Forces
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit — in theater
82nd Airborne Div. HQ + brigade combat team — deploying
~40,000–50,000 pre-existing US personnel across the region
Air Power
F-22 Raptors (12) — Ovda AB, Israel (first US offensive weapons in Israel)
F-35 stealth strike fighters — multiple bases
F-15E Strike Eagles (~35) — Muwaffaq Salti AB, Jordan
B-2 Spirit bombers — est. 26% of total fleet deployed
B-52Hs — Diego Garcia (AGM-158 JASSM standoff strike capable)
E-3 AWACS — 66–75% of total fleet deployed; one damaged in Saudi strike
KC-135 tankers — multiple damaged in Iranian attack
Missile Defense & Command
Patriot batteries at Al Udeid, Prince Sultan, Jordan
MEAD-CDOC — 17-nation integrated air defense at Al Udeid
Fifth Fleet HQ Bahrain: skeleton crew only; all ships cleared port
Qatar opposed as launch base; partial Al Udeid evacuation Jan. 14
Section III — New Development
The Houthi Variable: A Second Chokepoint at Risk
⚠ Breaking — March 29, 2026: Houthis Enter the War
Yemen's Houthis fired ballistic missiles at Israel, announcing formal entry "in support of Iran."
Their deputy minister stated: "The Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and Bab al-Mandeb will be among our
options." Oil immediately climbed above $116/bbl on the news.
The Double Chokepoint Nightmare Scenario
Strait of Hormuz (Closed)
~20M barrels/day disrupted. Closed since March 4. Carries 20% of global seaborne oil. Only
partial bypass (~5M bbl/d) via Saudi/UAE pipelines — routed through the Red Sea. Iran's
parliament has already voted to charge a toll for future passage.
Bab al-Mandeb (Threatened)
10–12% of global maritime trade. The Saudi Yanbu bypass — the ONLY significant oil relief
valve — passes directly through Houthi missile range. A Bab al-Mandeb blockade doesn't just
add to the Hormuz crisis: it eliminates the only existing pressure release valve
entirely.
Critical Compounding Effect: Saudi Arabia is rerouting close to 5 million barrels/day
across the peninsula to Red Sea terminals. This bypass — the only partial relief for the global energy
crisis — passes directly within Houthi missile and drone range. Houthi activation doesn't just add to
the Hormuz problem; it removes the only cushion.
Current Status
Symbolic Entry — Israel Strikes Only
Missile salvos at southern Israel (intercepted). Bab al-Mandeb
shipping remains open. This is political signaling — demonstrating solidarity with Iran without
yet pulling the maritime trigger.
Escalation Trigger
Red Sea Shipping Attacks Resume
Triggered by US ground operations in Iran, strikes on Iranian energy
infrastructure, or Hodeidah port attacks. Houthis have advanced to high ground overlooking Bab
al-Mandeb approach routes. "Even limited disruptions could have outsized effects," per Sana'a
Center analysts.
Worst Case
Full Bab al-Mandeb Blockade
Both straits simultaneously closed. Global oil shortfall approaches
18–20M bbl/day with no bypass. IEA's 400M barrel reserve covers less than 3 weeks of the
combined deficit. Oil spikes toward $150–$200/bbl. No near-term solution exists.
Houthi Strategic Calculus
Factors Pushing Escalation
Deep ideological alignment with Iran — "more likely to align with primary strategic partner
in decisive moments"
US strikes on Iranian energy/water infrastructure cited as explicit escalation trigger
Ground operations on Iranian territory or islands named as red lines
Recent coastal advances give Houthis best-ever Bab al-Mandeb firing positions
Opportunity to strike Saudi tankers at Yanbu — a long-desired target
Factors Restraining Escalation
Saudi-Houthi détente since 2022 has paused Yemen civil war — full escalation risks Saudi
military re-entry
Yemeni public less enthusiastic about dying for Iran than they were for Palestine
Houthis risk repeat of devastating US air campaign from early 2025
Blocking Saudi exports would alienate China — a key Houthi economic patron
May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire still nominally in place
Intelligence Note: The Houthis are specifically awaiting an Iranian signal to escalate
"if US military actions weaken Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz" (The Times, March 16). This means
Options 3, 4, and 5 all carry near-certain Houthi Bab al-Mandeb activation as a co-consequence — a
critical compounding factor that must be planned for simultaneously.
Section IV
Trump's Five Options — Analysis & Consequences
Five strategic paths in ascending order of military commitment, each evaluated for costs and outcomes
across the US, Iran, the global economy, and the Houthi/Bab al-Mandeb dimension.
Wind down combat operations after achieving nuclear/missile
objectives; pressure Iran diplomatically and via allies to reopen the Strait without further
military force.
Likelihood
~65%
[expand]
Trump declares Operation Epic Fury has achieved its core objectives and withdraws within 2–3
weeks. A two-track post-war strategy follows: direct diplomatic pressure on Tehran, and a
multilateral coalition (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, Egypt, NATO) to manage Strait access. The
Wall Street Journal confirmed Trump told aides this is his preference. The White House confirmed
reopening the Strait is not a "core objective."
🇺🇸 United States
Avoids catastrophic casualty risk of ground operations —
preserves lives and hardware.
Trump declares "mission accomplished" on nuclear/missile goals
within his timeline.
Severe credibility damage: spent $100B+, 13 KIA, but failed to
compel Iran to reopen a 21-mile strait. Every adversary recalibrates.
Gulf Arab allies who absorbed Iranian strikes on their own soil
in support of US operations feel abandoned.
Iran's deterrence model validated: absorb strikes, keep Strait
closed, outlast American will.
🇮🇷 Iran
Military devastated but retains the Strait as its ultimate
strategic lever.
Paradox: Iran cannot export its own oil through a closed Strait
either — mutual economic pain becomes the actual negotiating lever.
Parliament's Hormuz toll plan signals Iran intends to monetize,
not just weaponize, the Strait.
Fractured successor leadership increases diplomatic
unpredictability significantly.
Pivots to China-Russia economic architecture for
reconstruction.
🌐 World Economy
Oil stays $100–$115/bbl for 6–18 months as markets price
sustained diplomatic uncertainty.
Asian economies face prolonged energy squeeze — China, Japan,
South Korea, India.
European gas storage refill season threatened; UK inflation
projected to breach 5%.
Goldman Sachs: 25% US recession probability; GDP growth trimmed
0.3 percentage points.
Houthi Risk: A US exit signals to the Houthis that no significant retaliation
is coming. This increases the probability of Bab al-Mandeb shipping attacks resuming —
eliminating the Saudi Red Sea bypass and pushing oil toward $130+. Iranian-Houthi coordination
is described as tight and operational.
US Military Cost: MinimalUS Credibility: Severe LossIran: Survives with LeverageOil Return to $70: 18–30 monthsHouthi Risk: Elevated
2
Air/Missile Escalation · ~45% Probability
Obliterate Energy Infrastructure, Then Exit
Strike Iran's power grid, oil wells, Kharg Island, and possibly
desalination plants, then withdraw — leaving Iran too economically destroyed to function.
Likelihood
~45%
[expand]
Trump has publicly threatened this on Truth Social: "completely obliterate all of their electric
generating plants, oil wells and Kharg Island." A punitive air-and-missile campaign against
civilian and energy infrastructure followed by US withdrawal. B-2 bombers, F-35/F-15E packages,
and SSGN Tomahawk salvos are the primary instruments. An April 6 deadline was set — then pushed
back twice.
Achieves maximum punitive impact within Trump's timeline without
a ground war.
Severe international backlash: strikes on power plants and
desalination plants widely characterized as violations of international humanitarian law
by CSIS, Amnesty International, and legal scholars.
Critical strategic paradox: destroying Iran's oil infrastructure
removes its economic motivation to reopen the Strait — Iran earns nothing from an open
Strait if it has no oil to export.
🇮🇷 Iran
Power grid destruction means hospitals, water pumping stations,
and food refrigeration collapse within days to weeks.
Kharg destruction eliminates Iran's oil export hub for years —
removes the economic incentive to cooperate on Hormuz.
Iran retaliates against Saudi Aramco and UAE ports before US
withdrawal is complete.
Fractured leadership loses all ability to make or honor
diplomatic commitments.
🌐 World Economy
Oil spikes to $130–$160/bbl as markets price permanent loss of
Iranian export capacity.
Fertilizer crisis deepens: Kharg destruction during spring
planting season devastates global food supply; urea prices already up 50%.
Oxford Economics "breaking point" of $140/bbl for 2 months moves
from stress case to base case.
Oil return to $70/bbl: 3–5 years at earliest given permanent
infrastructure destruction.
Houthi Risk — Near-Certainty of Escalation: Iranian military sources explicitly
stated that US strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure are a direct trigger for Houthi Bab
al-Mandeb activation. A combined Hormuz + Bab al-Mandeb blockade pushes global oil disruption
toward 18–20M bbl/day with no bypass — the $200/bbl scenario.
US Legitimacy: Severe DamageUS Military Cost: Low-MediumHormuz: Still Likely ClosedOil Return to $70: 3–5+ yearsHouthi Risk: Near-Certain Escalation
3
Best Risk-Adjusted Option · ~40% Probability
Seize Strategic Islands to Force Hormuz Open
Amphibious assault on Abu Musa, Larak, the Tunbs, and/or Qeshm
Island to neutralize Iran's anti-ship missile infrastructure and establish maritime control
of the Strait.
Likelihood
~40%
[expand]
The 31st MEU and USS Tripoli ARG are the primary assault elements. Qeshm Island is identified as
the "ultimate strategic prize" — housing an underground "missile city" designed to control the
Strait. A sequential campaign starts with smaller islands to degrade Iranian ISR and anti-ship
launchers, creating conditions for full maritime reopening. This is the most likely actual use
of deployed ground forces per multiple independent analysts, and has broad Gulf Arab
backing.
🇺🇸 United States
Achieves the strategically decisive objective: free navigation
restored through the world's most critical oil chokepoint.
US casualties: projected 150–600 KIA/WIA across sequential
island assaults depending on IRGC resistance, drone saturation, and mainland missile
fire.
Critical MCM gap: only 4 Avenger minesweepers remain in the
Navy, all in Japan — mine-clearing is the most obvious operational shortfall.
Extends conflict 4–6 weeks past Trump's timeline, but with a
concrete strategic payoff that justifies the extension politically.
🇮🇷 Iran
Loss of island positions strips Iran's primary Strait
interdiction mechanism — arguably exceeds nuclear losses in long-term significance.
IRGC island garrisons estimated at 1,000–3,000 per island; will
fight with prepared defenses. Iranian casualties: 2,000–8,000 across the campaign.
Iran has threatened to invade Gulf Arab countries and mine the
Persian Gulf if US troops land on Iranian territory.
Loss of Qeshm eliminates Iran's long-term Strait deterrent — an
irreversible strategic loss for a generation.
🌐 World Economy
Successful reopening is the highest-impact positive outcome —
every day of restored transit is worth $2–4 billion in trade value.
Oil falls from ~$110–$120 toward $85–$95 within weeks of
credible reopening; $75–$80 by Q4 2026.
Qatari LNG resumes; European gas storage refill season saved if
Strait opens by late April–May.
Pre-war $70/bbl: achievable within 12–18 months post-reopening
if no further escalation.
Houthi Risk — Near-Certain Escalation: Iranian military sources explicitly
stated that action on "Iranian islands" triggers Bab al-Mandeb activation. The US must therefore
plan simultaneous two-theater operations — Hormuz islands AND Red Sea/Houthi suppression. The
minesweeper gap and damaged AWACS fleet make this operationally demanding but manageable with
existing carrier assets.
Strategic Outcome: High ValueUS Military Cost: Medium-HighHormuz: Likely ReopenedHouthi: Near-Certain TriggerOil Return to $70: 12–18 months
4
High-Risk / High-Leverage · ~25% Probability
Seize Kharg Island — Economic Decapitation
Amphibious assault and occupation of Kharg Island — Iran's primary
oil export hub — as a coercive bargaining chip to compel Strait reopening and a
comprehensive settlement.
Likelihood
~25%
[expand]
Kharg Island handles ~90% of Iranian oil exports. Seizing it gives the US a tangible bargaining
chip: return Kharg and lift sanctions in exchange for verified Strait reopening and nuclear
guarantees. However, the NYT reported that US decapitation of Iranian leadership has hampered
Tehran's ability to know what it can concede — presenting a serious negotiation paradox: maximum
leverage but no coherent counterpart to negotiate with.
🇺🇸 United States
Highest possible leverage short of regime change: the US holds
Iran's most valuable economic asset.
Assault casualties: 200–500 US KIA/WIA; Iranian shore-based
mainland batteries present extreme risk to amphibious forces.
Occupation costs mount rapidly: continuous Iranian
counter-strikes, drone barrages, and VBIED attacks require sustained force presence for
weeks to months.
Triggers all stated Iranian tripwires: Gulf Arab invasion
threat, Persian Gulf mining, full proxy activation.
🇮🇷 Iran
Loss of Kharg = total economic collapse; Iran cannot fund its
government or reconstruction without it.
IRGC garrison estimated at 1,000–3,000; will fight continuously
backed by mainland fires.
Iran will immediately mine the Persian Gulf — extending the
energy crisis by months regardless of the assault's outcome.
Creates maximum pressure to negotiate — but fractured leadership
may be incapable of coherent response.
🌐 World Economy
Markets spike to $125–$145/bbl during operations as Gulf
retaliation risk peaks.
Success + negotiated settlement: oil falls to $80–$90 within 1–2
months of reopening.
Failure or bogged-down assault: oil approaches $150–$200/bbl,
triggering global recession.
Pre-war $70/bbl: 12–24 months post-settlement in success
scenario; 3–7 years in failure scenario.
Houthi Risk — Certain Maximum Escalation: Kharg seizure is the most explicit
trigger for full Houthi Bab al-Mandeb activation per the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies. A
simultaneous Kharg assault + Bab al-Mandeb blockade creates the double-chokepoint nightmare with
no bypass route and 20+ million bbl/day shortfall — strategic reserves cover less than 3 weeks
of the combined deficit.
Leverage: MaximumUS Military Cost: HighEscalation Risk: Very HighHouthi: Certain Maximum EscalationOil Return to $70: 12–24 months (if it works)
5
Maximum Commitment · Least Likely · ~10%
Extended Ground Campaign / Regime Change
Multi-week ground campaign combining 82nd Airborne, Marines, and
SOF to penetrate coastal Iran, neutralize missile sites, extract nuclear material, and force
a post-regime settlement.
Likelihood
~10%
[expand]
The most expansive option discussed at the Pentagon involves weeks of ground operations,
potentially including missions to physically extract Iran's enriched uranium from underground
sites at Isfahan. Current force deployment — one MEU, one airborne brigade — is wholly
inadequate; 50,000–100,000+ troops would be needed. Political viability in the US is essentially
zero: no congressional authorization, no public support, no coalition partners for a third
Middle East ground war.
🇺🇸 United States
Catastrophic casualty potential: 2,000–10,000+ US KIA/WIA
against prepared IRGC defenses, drone swarms, and ballistic missiles.
No Gulf Arab nation will provide staging territory for a
mainland Iran invasion — US loses forward basing entirely.
Would trigger China and Russia to actively intervene materially
— risks multi-power confrontation.
Political viability: zero. Politically fatal for Trump
domestically before November 2026 midterms.
🇮🇷 Iran
Triggers total national mobilization — the Islamic Republic's
most existential crisis since the Iran-Iraq War; potentially unifies a divided
population against the invader.
Iran immediately mines the entire Persian Gulf — irreversible
actions taking years to clear.
🌐 World Economy
Oil immediately spikes to $150–$200/bbl — triggers global
recession across all major oil importers per Bloomberg and Oxford Economics.
China and Russia use the crisis to accelerate de-dollarization
of global oil trade permanently.
GCC food/water humanitarian crisis becomes full emergency.
Pre-war $70/bbl: potentially 5–10 years away.
Houthi Risk — Full Theater War: A mainland Iran ground campaign is the single
most powerful activator of the entire "Axis of Resistance" network. Houthis immediately close
Bab al-Mandeb. Iraqi Shia militia target US forces across Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah remnants
re-engage in Lebanon. The US would be simultaneously fighting in Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon
with inadequate forces and zero political support at home.
US Casualties: Potentially CatastrophicUS Political Viability: Near ZeroIran: Existential WarGlobal Economy: Recession Near-CertaintyHouthi: Full Theater War
Section V
Comparative Options Matrix
Option
Hormuz
US Casualties
US Credibility
Houthi / B.A.M.
Oil: Immediate
Oil → $70
Recession Risk
1 — Diplomatic Exit
HormuzLikely stays closed
US CasualtiesMinimal
US CredibilitySevere loss
Houthi / B.A.M.Elevated
Oil: Immediate$100–$115
Oil → $7018–30 months
Recession RiskModerate–High
2 — Obliterate & Exit
HormuzStill closed
US CasualtiesLow (air)
US CredibilityPariah risk
Houthi / B.A.M.Near-certain
Oil: Immediate$130–$160
Oil → $703–5+ years
Recession RiskHigh
3 — Seize Islands ★
HormuzLikely reopened
US Casualties150–600
US CredibilityRestored
Houthi / B.A.M.Near-certain trigger
Oil: ImmediateSpike then fall
Oil → $7012–18 months
Recession RiskLow if swift
4 — Seize Kharg
HormuzConditional
US Casualties200–500+
US CredibilityHigh if it works
Houthi / B.A.M.Certain max.
Oil: Immediate$125–$145
Oil → $7012–24 months
Recession RiskHigh during op
5 — Ground Campaign
HormuzMined/destroyed
US Casualties2,000–10,000+
US CredibilityTotal collapse
Houthi / B.A.M.Full theater war
Oil: Immediate$150–$200+
Oil → $705–10+ years
Recession RiskNear-certainty
Section VI
Oil Price Recovery Scenarios — Why This Matters for Lodi
Brent crude is currently $110–$126/barrel against a pre-war baseline of ~$70. The key variable is Hormuz
plus Bab al-Mandeb. With Houthis now active, downside scenarios are materially more probable.
For Lodi residents, the direct impact is pump prices — California gas prices already reflect the ~57%
crude increase — and upstream food and fertilizer costs that will affect Central Valley agriculture.
The Houthi Multiplier: Before Houthi entry, Saudi/UAE pipeline bypass routes were
rerouting ~5M bbl/day through the Red Sea — partially cushioning the Hormuz closure. Houthi activation
removes this cushion entirely, making the effective Hormuz closure ~25–30% more severe in supply terms.
Best Case
Swift Resolution
$75–$80
Return to ~$70 by Q1 2027
Option 3 (island seizure) reopens Hormuz by mid-April. Houthis stand down.
IEA reserves prevent acute shortage. Markets reprice immediately. Requires: credible military
action AND simultaneous Houthi deterrence.
Base Case
Prolonged Diplomacy
$95–$110
Return to ~$70 by mid-2027
Option 1 exit; partial reopening by May–June. Houthis limited to symbolic
strikes. Goldman Sachs: 25% US recession odds. European gas storage refill partially salvaged.
Stress Case
Dual Disruption
$130–$160
Return to ~$70 not before 2028
Option 2 triggers Houthi Bab al-Mandeb attacks. Saudi Red Sea bypass
eliminated. Dallas Fed: $132/bbl if strait closed 3 quarters. Oxford Economics: eurozone, UK,
and Japan enter contraction.
Worst Case
Double Chokepoint Catastrophe
$150–$200+
Return to $70 in 5–10+ years
Option 5 or failed Kharg assault triggers simultaneous Hormuz closure, Bab
al-Mandeb blockade, and Gulf mining. Global recession near-certainty. GCC humanitarian crisis.
China/Russia restructure global energy finance permanently.
Section VII
Strategic Assessment & Bottom Line
Dominant Option: Option 3 — sequential seizure of strategic Hormuz islands — offers the
best risk-adjusted outcome. It achieves the decisive objective (Hormuz reopening), is supported by
deployed force structure, has Gulf Arab backing, and avoids the humanitarian and legal catastrophe of
Options 2 and 5. Its key cost — Houthi escalation — must be planned for simultaneously and is a
manageable military problem with existing carrier assets.
The arrival of the Houthis fundamentally changes the strategic calculus: any option involving landing on
Iranian territory (Options 3, 4, 5) now carries near-certain Bab al-Mandeb activation as a
co-consequence. The US must approach remaining options as requiring simultaneous two-theater operations
— Hormuz islands AND Red Sea/Houthi suppression.
The most dangerous scenario is sequential drift: Trump exits diplomatically (Option 1), the Strait stays
closed, Houthis resume Red Sea attacks eliminating the bypass, oil hits $130+, Trump escalates
reactively to Option 2 — which paradoxically removes Iran's incentive to reopen the Strait by destroying
its oil export capacity, creating a situation with no resolution pathway and oil approaching $160+
indefinitely.
Iran's Post-War Position
Nuclear program set back a generation
IRGC command fractured by decapitation strikes
Economy devastated — but Strait geography remains as permanent leverage
China-Russia economic pivot for reconstruction underway
Parliament's Hormuz toll plan: monetize, not just weaponize, the Strait
Arab neighbors permanently hostile; regional isolation locked in for years
US Diplomatic Position
Credibility defined by Hormuz outcome — not nuclear success
Gulf Arab allies' confidence hinges entirely on Strait resolution
European allies have not contributed naval assets and will not absorb blame
China and Russia positioned to exploit any exit without resolution
Trump's domestic position tied directly to pump prices — the most politically damaging
outcome before November 2026 midterms
Window for optimal outcome closes at mid-April 2026
The Clock: Oil industry executives and multiple economic models have identified
mid-April 2026 as the inflection point after which supply disruption damage becomes structural rather
than acute. The Houthi entry has moved that deadline forward. Every week of delay narrows the range of
good outcomes and expands the range of catastrophic ones.
