US Oil Companies in Venezuela - January 2026
US Oil Companies in Venezuela: Comprehensive Analysis
Executive Summary
As of January 9, 2026, Chevron remains the only US oil company with active operations in Venezuela, producing approximately 200,000-240,000 barrels per day through joint ventures. The Trump administration is aggressively courting major US oil companies to invest in Venezuela's deteriorating oil infrastructure, claiming potential investments of $100 billion and rapid production increases. However, industry experts present a significantly more cautious assessment, projecting multi-year timelines and investment requirements exceeding $183 billion to restore production to historical levels.
Current US Company Presence in Venezuela
Chevron Corporation - Active Operations
Total employees: Approximately 3,000 personnel in Venezuela. Recently recalled 20+ employees to resume operations. Current production ranges from 200,000-240,000 barrels per day (some sources indicate up to 300,000 bpd), representing approximately 20-30% of Venezuela's total oil output.
Operating Locations
- Petropiar Joint Venture (Orinoco Belt, Eastern Venezuela)
- Chevron stake: 30%, PDVSA stake: 70%
- Houses one of only four upgraders in Venezuela (the only one currently operational)
- Available storage capacity
- Petroboscan Joint Venture (Lake Maracaibo Basin, Western Venezuela)
- Chevron stake: 39%, PDVSA stake: 61%
- Focuses on conventional oil production
- Limited storage capacity
- PetroIndependencia (Orinoco Belt) - Chevron stake: 34%
- PetroIndependiente (Western Venezuela) - Chevron stake: 25%
- Loran Natural Gas Field - Chevron stake: 60%, maritime border with Trinidad & Tobago
Planned Expansion
- Chevron expects to increase production by 50% over the next two years (from ~240,000 to ~360,000 bpd)
- Potential cash flow increase: $400-700 million annually (representing 1-2% of operational cash flow)
- Seeking expanded US license to trade PDVSA's output and sell to third parties
- Current exports restricted to ~100,000 bpd as of December 2025
ExxonMobil - Seeking Re-Entry
Approximately $20 billion in claims against Venezuela for nationalized assets. Secured $908 million for Cerro Negro Project and $260 million for La Ceiba Project. Additional $1.4 billion arbitration award was annulled with a new claim filed.
Current Status
- No active operations since exiting in 2007
- CEO Darren Woods stated Venezuela is currently "uninvestable"
- Requires "durable investment protections" and fundamental changes to legal/commercial framework
- Willing to send technical assessment teams with security guarantees
- No employees or contractors currently in Venezuela
Near-Term Plans
- Short-term: Deploy technical teams to assess asset conditions
- Requires stable government and fiscal environment before major capital allocation
- No specific investment commitments announced
ConocoPhillips - Monitoring Situation
Approximately $12 billion in claims for expropriated assets.
Current Status
- No active operations since 2007 exit
- Taking a "monitoring" approach to developments
- No employees or contractors currently in Venezuela
- Would be premature to speculate on future business activities without stable conditions
US Oilfield Services Companies
Halliburton (HAL)
Historical Presence & Current Status
Established Venezuelan operations in 1940 with long-standing PDVSA relationships. Participated in White House meeting January 9, 2026. Stock gained 7.9% on Venezuela news (January 5, 2026).
Planned Role: Expected to capture significant share of cementing and completion contracts. Specializes in Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) for heavy oil with remote monitoring via digital twin technology.
Investment Potential: Analysts estimate $10+ billion in immediate capital investment needed for service contracts.
SLB (formerly Schlumberger)
- Attended White House meeting; previously held sanctions waivers
- Stock gained 9% on January 5, 2026
- Focused on international offshore and digital services
Baker Hughes (BKR)
- Participated in industry discussions
- Stock gained in initial market reaction
- Pivoted toward industrial energy technology and LNG
US Gulf Coast Refiners
Several US refiners are positioned to benefit from Venezuelan heavy crude imports:
- Marathon Petroleum - Announced intent to bid for Venezuelan crude; owns large Garyville facility configured for heavy crude
- Valero Energy - Surged 9.2% on Venezuela news; well-equipped for heavy, sulfur-laden crude
- Phillips 66 - Rose 7.2% on news; configured for Venezuelan-type crude
- PBF Energy - Gained 3.4% on market speculation
- Citgo Petroleum - Venezuelan-owned but severed ties with PDVSA in 2019; board decided to participate in crude auctions
Critical Infrastructure Assessment
Export Terminals
Puerto José Terminal (Anzoátegui, Caribbean Coast)
- Handles approximately 90% of Venezuelan exports
- Key for Orinoco Belt production
- Equipment in severe disrepair; loading takes 5 days vs. 1 day in 2019
- Upgrading contract signed with Iranian firm Petropars in 2023
- Critical bottleneck for production increases
Puerto Miranda (Lake Maracaibo)
- Largest terminal in South America
- Satellite imagery shows significant deterioration: storage tanks show rust and dirt accumulation
Other Terminals
- Amuay Bay (Paraguaná Peninsula): ~5% of exports
- Puerto La Cruz: Secondary terminal
- El Palito (Carabobo): Refinery complex
Pipeline Network
- 25 operational pipelines with total capacity of 9 million bpd
- Total length: 2,139 miles
- Average age: Over 50 years old
- Prone to daily spills, corrosion, and leaks
- PDVSA 2021 estimate: $8 billion needed for pipeline restoration alone
Upgraders
- Venezuela has four upgrading units total
- Only ONE currently operational (Chevron's Petropiar facility)
- Upgraders essential for converting extra-heavy crude to marketable form
- Cost to build new upgrader: Tens of billions of dollars
- Timeline for new construction: 3-6 years
Refineries
Paraguaná Refining Center
- Capacity: 940,000 bpd
- Current operation: 10% of capacity
Overall Refinery Status
- Operating at approximately 20% of potential capacity
- Frequent outages and fires
- Equipment degradation from theft, fires, and neglect
Drilling Rigs
- Only 2 operational rigs in Venezuela in 2025
- Down from 24 in 2019 and 67 in 2015
- Significant reduction in drilling capacity
Production Projections by Timeline
Current Production (2026)
Venezuela total: 900,000 - 1.1 million bpd
Chevron operations:
200,000-240,000 bpd
Historical peak (1997-1999): 3.5 million bpd
1-Year Outlook (2027)
Industry Expert Consensus
- 1.3-1.4 million bpd with political transition (JPMorgan)
- Can add 300,000-350,000 bpd without large costs (Rystad)
- 500,000 bpd increase potential (Citi)
- "Several hundred thousand barrels per day" with orderly transition (RBC Capital Markets)
Chevron-Specific
360,000 bpd from Chevron operations (50% increase over 2 years)
Investment Required
$30-35 billion in international capital needed in next 2-3 years for sustained recovery (Rystad)
5-Year Outlook (2031)
Optimistic Scenarios
- 2.5 million bpd over next decade with major investments (JPMorgan)
- 2 million bpd by 2032 with $8-9 billion annually (Rystad)
- 1.5-2 million bpd within 2 years with credible government (Columbia University)
Realistic Assessment
- Doubling to 2 million bpd would take 5-7 years minimum (Rystad)
- Requires consistent investment and political stability
Investment Required
$8-9 billion per year to exceed 1.4 million bpd
10-Year Outlook (2036)
Industry Expert Consensus
- 3 million bpd by 2040 (Rystad)
- Potentially 2.5 million bpd over decade (JPMorgan)
- Could approach 3 million bpd with sustained stability (Westpac Banking)
Investment Required
- $183 billion total in oil and gas CAPEX from 2026-2040 to reach 3 million bpd (Rystad)
- $156 billion in service purchases once governance reforms implemented
- $53-54 billion needed just to maintain current 1.1 million bpd over next 15 years
Investment Requirements by Category
Short-Term Stabilization (0-18 months)
- $7 billion to increase production to 1.5 million bpd (estimate)
- Emergency repairs and maintenance
- Diluent supplies (naphtha, condensate)
- Equipment imports to prevent industry collapse
Medium-Term Recovery (2-5 years)
- $30-35 billion in foreign investment minimum
- Pipeline restoration: $8 billion
- Upgrader repairs and new construction: $10+ billion
- Refinery modernization: Multiple billions
Long-Term Restoration (10+ years)
- Total $183 billion to restore to 3 million bpd by 2040
- $100-110 billion to reach 4 million bpd (alternative estimate)
- New upgrader construction: $1-2 billion each
- Complete infrastructure overhaul: $100+ billion
Maintenance Investment
- $53-54 billion over 15 years just to maintain 1.1 million bpd
- Approximately $3.5-3.6 billion annually for maintenance
Trump Administration Claims vs. Industry Expert Assessments
Trump Administration Position
Investment Projections
- "At least $100 billion" from oil companies
- Companies "ready and willing" to invest immediately
- US government may reimburse companies or they'll recover through revenue
Timeline Claims
- "Less than 18 months" to restore operations (Trump)
- Production increases will happen "pretty quickly" (Energy Secretary Wright)
- "Several hundred thousand barrels per day" increase in short to medium term (Wright)
- Production could rise from 800,000 to "well over 1 million" rapidly (Wright)
Price Targets
- Oil prices could drop to $50 per barrel (Trump)
- Goal to reduce from $56-58 to $50
Control Structure
- US will control Venezuelan oil sales "indefinitely" (Wright)
- Revenue managed by US government in US-controlled accounts
- Initial 30-50 million barrels to be transferred to US
Industry Expert Assessments
Investment Reality
- $183 billion needed to reach 3 million bpd by 2040 (Rystad Energy)
- $53-54 billion just to maintain current production over 15 years (Rystad)
- $10 billion annually for faster recovery over next decade (Rice University)
- $30-35 billion in foreign capital needed in first 2-3 years alone
Timeline Reality
- "Years, not months" for significant recovery
- 5-7 years minimum to double production to 2 million bpd (Rystad)
- Up to a decade to return to 3-3.5 million bpd historical levels
- "No realistic prospect of immediately increasing" output (Argus Media)
- Normal project cycles of 1-5 years likely to be longer in Venezuela
- Little chance increased spending affects supply before end of decade
Production Projections
- 1.3-1.4 million bpd within 2 years at best (JPMorgan)
- 300,000-350,000 bpd can be added quickly with limited spend (Rystad)
- 2 million bpd by 2032 (7 years away) with sustained investment (Rystad)
- 2.5 million bpd over next decade optimistically (JPMorgan)
Price Impact
- Limited near-term impact on global oil prices
- Venezuela produces less than 1% of global supply
- Global oil market has 3.8 million bpd surplus in 2026 (IEA projection)
- $50/barrel price would make Venezuelan drilling unprofitable for companies
- Goldman Sachs: Production increase of 400,000 bpd would only drop prices $2/barrel
Political/Legal Concerns
- "Currently uninvestable" (ExxonMobil CEO)
- Requires "durable investment protections" and fundamental legal framework changes
- Political stability remains "key hurdle"
- Companies burned by past nationalizations hesitant
- Security concerns for personnel and equipment
Key Differences Summary
| Aspect | Trump Administration | Industry Experts |
|---|---|---|
| Timeline | 18 months or less | 5-7 years minimum; up to decade+ |
| Investment | $100 billion claimed | $183 billion needed by 2040 |
| Near-term increase | "Several hundred thousand bpd" | 300,000-350,000 bpd maximum quickly |
| Price target | $50/barrel | Unrealistic; would make projects unprofitable |
| Feasibility | "Ready" and immediate | Requires years, stability, legal protections |
| Production path | Rapid restoration possible | Long, challenging road with major obstacles |
Major Challenges and Risk Factors
Infrastructure Degradation
- 50+ year-old pipeline network prone to daily spills
- Only 1 of 4 upgraders operational
- Refineries at 10-20% capacity
- Export terminals in severe disrepair
- Rigs reduced from 67 (2015) to 2 (2025)
Political/Legal Risks
- Interim government stability uncertain
- Past nationalizations create hesitancy
- Unresolved $32+ billion in claims (ExxonMobil + ConocoPhillips)
- US officials requiring investment before claim resolution
Security Concerns
- Concerns about personnel safety
- Equipment theft and looting at drilling sites
- Civil unrest potential
Economic Factors
- Current oil prices ($56-58/barrel) insufficient to justify major investment
- Global oil oversupply of 3.8 million bpd
- Low prices make heavy crude extraction uneconomical
- Venezuelan heavy crude requires specialized refining
Technical Challenges
- Extra-heavy crude requires specialized extraction (steam injection, upgrading)
- Diluent (naphtha, condensate) imports essential for production
- Loss of technical expertise from years of brain drain
- Equipment degradation from fires, theft, lack of maintenance
Conclusion
The gap between Trump administration claims and industry expert assessments is substantial. While the administration projects rapid recovery within 18 months with $100 billion in investment, industry analysts indicate realistic timelines of 5-10+ years requiring $183 billion in total investment.
Only Chevron maintains active operations with 3,000 employees producing 200,000-240,000 bpd, and is positioned to increase production by 50% over two years to approximately 360,000 bpd. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips have no current presence and have publicly stated Venezuela is "uninvestable" without fundamental legal and political reforms.
The consensus among industry experts is that modest production increases of 300,000-350,000 bpd are achievable in the short term (1-2 years) with limited investment, potentially reaching 1.3-1.4 million bpd within two years. However, restoration to historical levels of 3+ million bpd would require a decade or more with sustained investment exceeding $180 billion, political stability, legal protections, and resolution of outstanding claims.
The Trump administration's $50/barrel oil price target contradicts the economic reality that such prices would make Venezuelan heavy crude projects unprofitable, creating a fundamental tension between political goals and commercial viability.